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“Men are unable to forgive what they cannot punish.” 
 - Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (1958) 
INTRODUCTION 
Ten years after its statute came into force, the International 
Criminal Court (“ICC”) completed it first trial, issued its first verdict,1 
and sentenced its first perpetrator.2 The prospect of a permanent 
mechanism to bring to justice perpetrators of gross human rights 
violations has captured the imagination of ordinary people, victims, 
human rights advocates, and even celebrities. Angelina Jolie, actress 
                                                 
1 See Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-
2842, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, para. 1358 (Mar. 14, 2012), 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1379838.pdf.  
2 See Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-
2901, Decision on Sentence pursuant to Article 76 of the Statute, paras. 92-99 (July 
10, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1438370.pdf. 
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and Goodwill Ambassador for the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees, was in the court gallery to hear first- 
hand the judgment against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo.3 He was found 
guilty of war crimes for conscripting and enlisting children under the 
age of fifteen and using them to participate actively in hostilities.4 As 
a result, countless children died and those who survived will suffer 
continued psychological, emotional, and physical trauma for many 
years to come. For these grave crimes, Lubanga was sentenced to 
fourteen years of imprisonment.5 It was a significant day capping 
many “firsts” in the nascent life of the world’s first permanent 
international criminal justice mechanism: the first guilty verdict of the 
ICC, the first international trial to focus exclusively on child 
soldiering,6 and the first international trial to allow victims to 
participate directly in the trial proceedings.7 Nevertheless, important 
milestones and the successful prosecution of Lubanga are not likely 
                                                 
3 Ben Child, Kony 2012: Angelina Jolie calls for Ugandan warlord’s arrest, THE 
GUARDIAN, Mar. 12, 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/film/2012/mar/12/kony-
2012-angelina-jolie; Angelina Jolie attends ICC hearing to witness Lubanga Decision, 
AFRICANEWSWIRE.NET, Mar. 14 2012, 
http://www.africanewswire.net/story.php?title=angelina-jolie-attends-icc-hearing-
to-witness-lubanga-decision. See Angelina Jolie in court as ICC finds Congo warlord 
Thomas Lubanga guilty of using child soldiers, TELEGRAPH, Mar. 14, 2012, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/democraticre
publicofcongo/9143254/Angelina-Jolie-in-court-as-ICC-finds-Congo-warlord-
Thomas-Lubanga-guilty-of-using-child-soldiers.html, for a video of Ms. Jolie’s 
statements following the verdict. 
4 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Judgment pursuant to Article 74, 
supra note 1, at para.1358. See also Kai Ambos, The First Judgment of the International 
Criminal court (Prosecutor v. Lubanga): A Comprehensive Analysis of the Legal Issues, 12 
INT’L CR. L. REV. 115, 138-39 (2012); Diane Marie Amann, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, 
106 AM. J. INT’L L. 809, 812 (2012). 
5 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on Sentence pursuant 
to Article 76, supra note 2, at para. 99. 
6 See generally MARK A. DRUMBL, REIMAGINING CHILD SOLDIERS IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY (2012), for a reinvigorating and provocative 
examination of child soldiering.  
7 David Smith, Congo Child Army Leader Thomas Lubanga Found Guilty of 
War Crimes, THE GUARDIAN, Mar. 14 2012, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2012/mar/14/congo-warlord-thomas-lubanga-
icc?intcmp=239; Faith Karimi, ICC finds Congolese warlord guilty in its first verdict, CNN 
(Mar. 14, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/03/14/world/africa/hague-first-icc-
ruling/index.html?_s=PM:AFRICA. 
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to end the debate any time soon over the merits of the ICC and the 
role of international criminal justice mechanisms.8 Hours after the 
court sentenced Lubanga to fourteen years, negative reactions 
populated the media and the internet.9 For ICC Presiding Judge 
Adrian Fulford to stare down at Lubanga and forcefully declare that 
his crimes are “undoubtedly very serious crimes that affect the 
international community as a whole[,]”10 but then impose a 
punishment that is less then half of the maximum term penalty 
available under the ICC Statute must have been perplexing, even for 
supporters of the Court.11 Human rights observers criticized the 
punishment as “a rather low sentence in relation to the crimes that he 
                                                 
8 Criticisms have targeted both the ICC model as a viable justice 
mechanism post-atrocity and the way Luis Moreno-Ocampo, the ICC Prosecutor, 
conducted the investigations and trial. See Joshua Rozenberg, Delay in Lubanga 
judgment demonstrates ICC weaknesses, THE GUARDIAN, Mar. 14 2012, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2012/mar/14/delay-lubanga-weaknesses-icc-
model. 
9 See Rob Williams, The Thomas Lubanga Trial – Dangerous for Children, 
THOMSON REUTERS FOUND. (July 10, 2012), 
http://www.trust.org/item/?map=the-thomas-lubanga-trial-dangerous-for-
children (“The handing down of such a paltry penalty will surely give ammunition 
to the courts critics and represents a difficult moment in the history of efforts to 
stop the culture of impunity around gross abuses of human rights.”). See also 
Thomas Escritt, Congo warlord jailed for 14 years in landmark case, REUTERS, July 10, 
2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/10/us-warcrimes-lubanga-
idUSBRE8690C320120710; Mike Corder, Comments to Congolese Warlord To Prison 
For 14 Years, HUFFINGTON POST WORLD (last updated, July 10, 2012, 5:36 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/10/thomas-lubanga-sentenced-
international-criminal-court-congo_n_1661028.html (reader reactions include the 
following. “14 years is not long enough.” “Should have received life.” “Not long 
enough.” “Should have got 14 years per child.”). See Comments to Congo warlord 
jailed for 14 years in landmark case, REDDIT WORLD NEWS, 
http://www.reddit.com/r/worldnews/comments/wbqzs/congo_warlord_jailed_f
or_14_years_in_landmark/, for further reactions from readers. 
10 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on Sentence pursuant 
to Article 76, supra note 2, at para. 37. 
11 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 77, July 17, 1998, 
2187 U.N.T.S. 38544. The maximum imprisonment for a specific number of years 
is 30 years. Life sentence is permitted only “when justified by the extreme gravity of 
the crime and the individual circumstances of the convicted person.” Id. at art. 
77(1)(b). See also Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Policing International Prosecutors, 45 N.Y.U. J. 
INT’L L. & POL. 175, 224 (2012) (arguing that Lubanga’s low sentence can be 
attributed to a remedy for prosecutorial misconduct). 
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committed.”12 The Congolese government likewise agreed that 
Lubanga should have received a higher sentence, even though some 
punishment is still a “positive signal” for peace in the region.13 
Although Lubanga was sentenced to fourteen years of imprisonment, 
he will receive six years credit for time served during the trial. Thus, 
Lubanga will be out of prison in less than eight years.14 Moreover, if 
the ICC follows the practice of the ad hoc international criminal 
tribunals of releasing perpetrators after they have served two-thirds 
of their sentence, Lubanga will be released in a little more than five 
years. 
More significantly, despite all the ceremony and controversy15  
surrounding the Lubanga trial, the sentencing judgment presented the 
ICC judges with a significant opportunity to clarify the function and 
purpose of international criminal law (“ICL”). Its first sentencing 
judgment offered a seminal opportunity for the Court to elucidate the 
role of the world’s first permanent criminal court with global reach. 
Such clarity regarding the foundations of international justice is 
essential to the operation of the court from start to finish, from 
providing a vision to guide the work of the ICC and its Prosecutor to 
facilitating consistency in punishment. It would also facilitate better 
understanding of the Court’s decisions among communities and 
individuals impacted by the crimes. 
                                                 
12 DR Congo warlord Thomas Lubanga sentenced to 14 years, BBC, July 10, 
2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-18779726; David Smith, Thomas 
Lubanga sentenced to 14 years for Congo war crimes, THE GUARDIAN, July 10, 2012, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2012/jul/10/icc-sentences-thomas-lubanga-14-
years.  
13 DR Congo warlord Thomas Lubanga sentenced to 14 years, supra note 12. 
14 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on Sentence pursuant 
to Article 76, supra note 2, at paras. 107-8. Lubanga is currently being detained at 
the Detention Centre in The Hague. Situations: The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, 
ICC-CPI.INT, http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%20
0104/related%20cases/icc%200104%200106/Pages/democratic%20republic%20o
f%20the%20congo.aspx (last visited Oct. 12, 2013). 
15 See Joshua Rozenberg, supra note 8. See also William A. Schabas, Victor’s 
Justice: Selecting “Situations” at the International Criminal Court, 43 JOHN MARSHALL L. 
REV. 535 (2010). 
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Unfortunately, the ICC’s first sentencing judgment is 
disappointingly perfunctory regarding the fundamental pillars of the 
system, leaving open a deeply divisive question that could jeopardize 
the legitimacy and success of this endeavour. Moving towards clarity 
on this question is the main goal of this article. It permeates every 
critical decision of the ICC: the Prosecutor’s selection of cases and 
defendants;16 decisions about the scope of the indictment and 
witnesses called;17 the manner in which the trial proceedings are 
conducted; judicial oversight of the Prosecutor’s decisions and 
conduct;18 and the determination of a just punishment. Thus, the 
questions and critiques addressed here will have continued 
significance to both practice and theory in ICL. The experience of 
the ad hoc tribunals indicates that both the defendant and the 
prosecutor frequently challenge the trial chamber’s sentence on 
appeal, and the Lubanga case is no exception. Thus, the reflections 
offered in this article about the primary role and function of 
international criminal justice has immediate and long-term 
implications for Court’s work. 
Drawing on the experience of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) and the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”), this article argues that 
idealism about what international criminal justice mechanisms can 
achieve has lead to ideologically-driven judicial decision-making in 
international criminal law.19 ICL idealism manifests itself in the belief 
that international criminal prosecutions can achieve a wide range of 
aspirations and goals, both international and local.20 According to the 
                                                 
16 See generally Margaret M. deGuzman, Choosing to Prosecute: Expressive 
Selection at the International Criminal Court, 33 MICH. J. INT’L L. 265 (2012). 
17 See WILLIAM SCHABAS, UNIMAGINABLE ATROCITIES: JUSTICE, 
POLITICS, AND RIGHTS AT THE WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS, 162-64 (2012) (discussing 
the tension between the Prosecutor and judges at the ICTY regarding the scope of 
indictments based on competing visions of the role of the Tribunal). 
18 See generally Turner, Policing International Prosecutors, supra note 11; Jenia 
Iontcheva Turner, Legal Ethics in International Criminal Defense, 10 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1 
(2010). 
19 As used herein, ideology refers to a normative view that shapes an 
actor’s goals, expectations and actions. 
20 See U.N. Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in 
Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, paras. 38-39, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616 (Aug. 23, 
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Secretary General of the United Nations, international criminal 
tribunals pursue a number of aims including “bringing to justice 
those responsible for serious violations of human rights and 
humanitarian law, putting an end to such violations and preventing 
their recurrence, securing justice and dignity for victims, establishing 
a record of past events, promoting national reconciliation, re-
establishing the rule of law and contributing to restoration of 
peace.”21 Idealism about the institutional capacity of international 
tribunals also found expression in the reports of Judge Antonio 
Cassese, the first President of the ICTY and ICTR.22 Among the 
institutions’ “Future Priorities,” Judge Cassese confidently stated that 
the Tribunals were establishing an unassailable “historical record . . . 
thereby preventing historical revisionism,” which he lauded as “a 
most important function of the Tribunal.”23 In the case of the ICTY 
in particular, Cassese added that in their judicial proceedings 
international judges endeavored “to establish as judicial fact the full 
details of the madness that transpired in the former Yugoslavia.”24 
                                                 
2004), http://www.unrol.org/files/2004%20report.pdf (identifying deterrence, 
prevention, historical record, reconciliation, and reestablishing the rule of law and 
peace as objectives) [hereinafter UNSG Report on Transitional Justice]; U.N. 
Secretary-General, Fifth Annual Report of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of 
Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in 
the Territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991, para. 296, U.N. Doc. A/53/219-
S/1998/737 (Aug. 10, 1998), 
http://www.icty.org/x/file/About/Reports%20and%20Publications/AnnualRepo
rts/annual_report_1998_en.pdf (identifying prevention historical revisionism as “a 
most important function of the Tribunal”) [hereinafter ICTY President’s Fifth 
Annual Report]. See also Darryl Robinson, The Identity Crisis of International Criminal 
Law, 21 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 925 (2008) (discussing interpretation problems when 
ICL becomes “imbued with utopian aspirations”). 
21 UNSG Report on Transitional Justice, supra note 20, at para. 38. 
22 ICTY President’s Fifth Annual Report, supra note 20, at para. 296. 
23 ICTY President’s Fifth Annual Report, supra note 20, para. 296. Cf. 
Patricia Wald, The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Comes of Age: 
Some Observations on the Day-to-Day Dilemmas of an International Court, 5 WASH. U. J. 
LAW & POL’Y 87, 116-17 (2001) (noting that “the findings of judges may not 
produce the best approximations of history”). However, the factual accuracy of the 
historical record established by international tribunals has been challenged. See 
NANCY COMBS, FACT-FINDING WITHOUT FACTS: THE UNCERTAIN EVIDENTIARY 
FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS (2010). 
24 ICTY President’s Fifth Annual Report, supra note 20, at para. 296 
(emphasis added). 
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Furthermore, canvassing the discourse surrounding international 
criminal courts, the following ambitions are often associated with 
ICL: retribution, deterrence, reconciliation, rehabilitation, 
incapacitation, restoration, historical recording building, preventing 
revisionism, expressive functions, crystallizing international norms, 
general affirmative prevention, establishing peace, preventing war, 
vindicating international law prohibitions, setting standards for fair 
trials, and ending impunity.25 Ironically, such ambition, although 
usually well intended, has actually contributed to the politicization of 
the international judicial process.26 
                                                 
25 See e.g. SCHABAS, UNIMAGINABLE ATROCITIES, supra note 17, at 96; 
DRUMBL, REIMAGINING, supra note 6, at 151; Jan Nemitz, The Law of Sentencing in 
International Criminal Law: The Purposes of Sentencing and the Applicable Method for the 
Determination of the Sentence, 4 Y.B. OF INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. 87 (2001); GARY 
JONATHAN BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE: THE POLITICS OF WAR 
CRIMES TRIBUNALS 284 (2000); Turner, Legal Ethics, supra note 18; Minna Schrag, 
Lessons Learned from the ICTY Experience, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 427, 428 (2004); Jean 
Galbraith, The Pace of International Criminal Justice, 31 MICH. J. INT’L L. 79 (2009); 
Ruti Teitel, The Law and Politics of Contemporary Transitional Justice, 38 CORNELL INT’L 
L. J. 837, 857 (2005); Richard A. Wilson, Judging History: The Historical Record of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 27 HUM. RTS. Q. 908, 908 
(2005); Ralph Henham, The Philosophical Foundations of International Sentencing, 1 J. 
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 64 (2004); Martti Koskenniemi, Between Impunity and Show Trials, 6 
MAX PLANCK Y.B. UN L. 4 (2002); Robinson, The Identity Crisis of International 
Criminal Law, supra note 20, at 926, 994. 
26 This is especially true when judges rely too much on reconciliation 
ideology to justify their rulings. See Valery Perry, A Survey of Reconciliation Processes in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina: the Gap Between People and Politics, in RECONCILIATION(S): 
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN POST-CONFLICT SOCIETIES 207, 208 (Joanna R. Quinn 
ed., 2009) (stating that “‘[r]econciliation’ is a word rarely mentioned in good faith in 
political discourse.”). See also Statements on the Rome Conference Before the 
Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate, 105th Congress (July 23, 1998) 
(statements of David J. Scheffer, Ambassador at Large, War Crimes Issues, Head 
of U.S. Delegation to the U.N. Diplomatic Conference on the Establishment of a 
Permanent International Criminal Court), 
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/USScheffer_Senate23July98.pdf; Silvia A. 
Fernandez de Gurmendi, The Role of the International Prosecutor, in THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE 175, 
181 (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999). See generally Alexander K.A. Greenawalt, Justice Without 
Politics? Prosecutorial Discretion and the International Criminal Court, 39 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. 
& POL. 583 (2007). 
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My argument is that idealism about what international 
prosecutions can achieve has distorted the condemnation of high-
ranking perpetrators and just distribution of punishment among the 
actors responsible for mass atrocities. This idealism sometimes 
manifests in the socio-political context, such as the conviction that 
international prosecutions will ipso facto lead to reconciliation. Other 
times this idealism reflects traditional criminal law consequentialism. I 
develop this thesis by examining the application of the goals of 
reconciliation and deterrence when sentencing of perpetrators of 
atrocity crimes. My conclusion is that, while both reconciliation and 
deterrence are laudable aspirations, these ideologies have perversely 
impacted sentencing such that the punishment too often does not 
reflect the culpability of the individual. 
These ideologies have been interchangeably described as the 
purpose, aim, or objectives of international prosecutions, 
justifications for international criminal punishment, or sentencing 
rationales in international criminal law.27 Through unpacking the 
sentencing jurisprudence, this paper breaks new ground by advancing 
a theory on the relationship between ICL and consequentialist 
aspirations. Thus, the article’s findings are also instructive to 
international judges and others in the field for understanding how 
aspirations such as reconciliation and deterrence have influenced the 
severity of punishment at international criminal tribunals. The scope 
of this paper does not permit a full treatment of retributive 
approaches to ICL.28 It focuses primarily on a normative analysis of 
                                                 
27 See Allison Marston Danner, Constructing a Hierarchy of Crimes in 
International Criminal Law Sentencing, 87 VA. L. REV. 415, 417 (2001) (stating that 
sentencing standards remain ill-defined); Mirko Bagaric & John Morss, International 
Sentencing Law: In Search of a Justification and Coherent Framework, 6 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 
191, 253 (2006) (calling tribunal sentences “breathtakingly light”). 
28  For a discussion of retributive justification for ICL, see Jean 
Galbraith, The Good Deeds of International Criminal Defendants, 25 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 
799, 809-12 (2012). See generally Jens David Ohlin, Towards a Unique Theory of 
International Criminal Sentencing, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: 
TOWARDS A COHERENT BODY OF LAW 373 (Goran Sluiter & Sergey Vasiliev eds., 
2009); Andrew K. Woods, Moral Judgements & International Crimes: The Disutility of 
Desert, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 633 (2012). See Adil Ahmad Haque, Retributivism: The Right 
and the Good, 32 LAW & PHIL. 59 (2013) and Andrew von Hirsch, Proportionality in the 
Philosophy of Punishment, 16 CRIM. & JUST. 55, 59-63 (1992), for broader discussions 
on retributive theory. 
 2014 Dana 3:1 
39 
consequentialism, supported by an empirical and jurisprudential 
examination of its influence on sentencing. 
The perverse effects of this consequentialism frequently 
surface in the sentencing jurisprudence, giving critics an easy target to 
denounce international law as a political tool of powerful countries. 
In particular, ICL’s opponents target the apparently erratic sentences, 
the incoherent justifications, and the schizophrenic self-image of 
international criminal courts as evidence that international justice 
remains elusive in the current international paradigm, which is still 
largely the product of power.29 In a trial process that frequently 
appears opaque to outsiders because of complex facts, extraordinary 
crimes, and unfamiliar procedural rules, the sentence is one feature 
that is readily accessible to the affected communities. Unfortunately, 
as illustrated by local reactions and criticized by observers, the 
sentencing practice appears unprincipled, political and unjust.30 
Sentences imposed by international criminal courts are slowly 
becoming the system’s Achilles’ heel.31 This raises concerns even 
                                                 
29 See Mark Drumbl, Collective Violence and Individual Punishment: The 
Criminality of Mass Atrocity, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 539, 610 (2005) (observing that 
international criminal law sentencing “still remains confusing, unoriginal, 
unpredictable, and without the ordering benefits of a viable heuristic”) [hereinafter 
Drumbl, Collective Violence]; OLAOLUWA OLUSANYA, SENTENCING WAR CRIMES 
AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 139 (2005) (describing sentencing at the 
ICTY as a “lottery system [where] penalties are picked randomly” and as “a game 
of Russian roulette . . . entirely dependent on a particular judge”); Ralph Henham, 
Some Issues for Sentencing in the International Criminal Court, 52 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 81, 
82 (2003) (discussing “substantive irrationality and an absence of penological 
justifications for international sentencing praxis”); Dirk van Zyl Smit, Punishment by 
International Criminal Tribunals: Ideal Example for National Criminal Justice or Parody of a 
Penal Process?, presented at the annual meeting of the American Society of 
Criminology, Denver, USA (2003). 
30 Mirko Bagaric & John Morss, supra note 27, at 193 (concluding that 
international sentencing is “marked . . .by discretion and uncertainty”). See also 
Danner, supra note 27, at 501 (criticizing the “coherency of international justice at 
the ICTY and ICTR); Berislav Jelinić, Kevin Parker – The judge who freed the villains of 
Vukovar, NACIONAL (Oct. 2, 2007), 
http://www.nacional.hr/en/clanak/38490/kevin-parker-the-judge-who-freed-the-
villains-of-vukovar. 
31 See generally Shahram Dana, Beyond Retroactivity to Realizing Justice: A 
Theory on the Principle of Legality in International Criminal Law Sentencing, 99 J. CRIM. 
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among supports of international criminal tribunals. Yet, there has 
been insufficient scholarly attention on ICL sentencing in academic 
literature.32 This paper thus responds in part to this paucity. 
Specifically, this article explores the impact of 
consequentialist ideologies on international criminal justice, and in 
particular on sentencing of perpetrators.33 Part I elucidates the 
sentencing objectives advanced by the ad hoc international criminal 
tribunals.34 Here the goal is twofold: first, to gain initial clarity on 
what international judges purport to be the purpose of sentencing in 
international prosecutions, and second, to track trends and shifting 
methodologies by which judges construct this purposive narrative. 
Two objectives appeared most frequently in the early jurisprudence: 
retribution and deterrence.35 Reconciliation subsequently gained 
                                                 
LAW & CRIMINOLOGY 857 (2009) [hereinafter Dana, Beyond Retroactivity]; Mirko 
Bagaric & John Morss, supra note 27. 
32 Many thoughtful scholars have called for greater attention to be given 
to the developing a coherent theory for sentencing atrocity perpetrators. See, e.g., 
Robert Sloane, Sentencing for the “Crime of Crimes”: The Evolving ‘Common Law’ of 
Sentencing of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 713, 
733-34 (2007) (noting that sentencing has not yet become an integral part of 
international criminal justice, but continues to be treated as an afterthought); 
Drumbl, Collective Violence, supra note 29, at 610 (lamenting under-theorization on 
this subject and calling for the need for evaluative research on international 
sentencing).  
33 They could also be understood as utilitarian rationales. Other decisions 
influenced by one’s ideological vision of international prosecution include selection 
of situations, cases, defendants, and charges; presentation of evidence at trial; and 
punishment of perpetrators. 
34 Referring to the ICTR and the ICTY, which were established by U.N. 
Security Council Resolutions 955 and 827, respectively. See S.C. Res. 955, para. 1, 
49th Year, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994); S.C. Res. 827, para. 2, 48th Year, 
U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993).  
35 See Prosecutor v. Popović, Case No. IT-05-88-T, Trial Judgment, para. 
2128 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 10, 2010), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/popovic/tjug/en/100610judgement.pdf; 
 Prosecutor v. Lukić, Case No. IT-05-87, Trial Judgment, para. 1049 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 20, 2009), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/popovic/tjug/en/100610judgement.pdf; Prosecutor 
v. Milutinović, Case No. IT-05-87-T, Trial Judgment, Vol. 3, para. 1144 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 26, 2009), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/milutinovic/tjug/en/jud090226-e3of4.pdf; 
Prosecutor v. Delić, Case No. 1T-04-83-T, Trial Judgment, para. 559 (Int’l Crim. 
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Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 15, 2008), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/delic/tjug/en/080915.pdf; Prosecutor v. Milošević, 
Case No. IT-98-29/1-T, Trial Judgment, para. 987 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Dec. 12, 2007),  
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/dragomir_milosevic/tjug/en/071212.pdf; 
Prosecutor v. Martić, Case No. 95-11-T, Trial Judgment, para. 484 (Int’l Crim. Trib. 
for the Former Yugoslavia June 12, 2007), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/martic/tjug/en/070612.pdf; Prosecutor v. 
Zelenović, Case No IT-96-23/2-S, Sentencing Judgment, para. 31 (Int’l Crim. Trib. 
for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 4, 2007), 
 http://www.icty.org/x/cases/zelenovic/tjug/en/zel-sj070404-e.pdf; Prosecutor v. 
Krajišnik, Case No. IT-00-39-T, Trial Judgment, para. 1134 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 27, 2006), 
 http://www.icty.org/x/cases/krajisnik/tjug/en/kra-jud060927e.pdf; Prosecutor v. 
Orić, Case No. IT-03-68-T, Trial Judgment, para. 718 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia June 30, 2006), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/oric/tjug/en/ori-
jud060630e.pdf; Prosecutor v. Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Trial Judgment, para. 
723 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 30, 2005), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/limaj/tjug/en/lim-tj051130-e.pdf; Prosecutor v. 
Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T, Trial Judgment, para. 458 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Jan. 31, 2005), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/strugar/tjug/en/str-tj050131e.pdf; Prosecutor v. 
Blagojević & Jokić, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Trial Judgment, para. 817 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 17, 2005), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/blagojevic_jokic/tjug/en/bla-050117e.pdf; 
Prosecutor v. Deronjić, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 52, paras. 142-50; 
Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Trial Judgment, paras. 900-02 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 31, 2003), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/stakic/tjug/en/stak-tj030731e.pdf; Prosecutor v. 
Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, Trial Judgment, para. 838 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 22, 2001), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/kunarac/tjug/en/kun-tj010222e.pdf; Prosecutor v. 
Delalić, Case No. IT-96-21-A, Appellate Judgment, para. 806 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 20, 2001), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/mucic/acjug/en/cel-aj010220.pdf; Prosecutor v. 
Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-A, Appellate Judgment, para. 185 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 24, 2000), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/aleksovski/acjug/en/ale-asj000324e.pdf; Prosecutor 
v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Trial Judgment, paras. 761-62 (Int’l Crim. Trib. 
for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 3, 2000), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/blaskic/tjug/en/bla-tj000303e.pdf; Prosecutor v. 
Kupreškić, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Trial Judgment, para. 848 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 14, 2000), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/kupreskic/tjug/en/kup-tj000114e.pdf; Prosecutor v. 
Erdemović, Case No. IT-96-22-T, Sentencing Judgment, paras. 58, 64 (Int’l Crim. 
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considerable traction, especially after the sentencing of Biljana 
Plavšić,36 correlating with the coming of age of plea-bargaining at 
international tribunals.37 What started out as an ill-fated justification 
for plea-bargaining genocide morphed to a general aim of 
international prosecutions.38 
Part II examines more closely the influence of deterrence and 
reconciliation ideologies. The analysis demonstrates how these 
consequentialist ideologies lead to injustice and perverse results in 
sentencing. I argue that reconciliation should be abandoned as a 
rationale for sentencing purposes, and deterrence should be limited in 
its influence on the final sentence. Punishment influenced by these 
two ideologies often distorts the individual perpetrator’s culpability. 
This is not to say that international criminal justice cannot contribute 
to these aspirations, but rather that such aspirations should not be as 
influential in sentencing judgments as they have been thus far. As 
Hannah Arendt concluded regarding criminal trials for mass 
atrocities, after observing the prosecution of a former Nazi SS 
Lieutenant Colonel: “The purpose of a trial is to render justice and 
nothing else; even the noblest of ulterior purposes . . . only detract 
                                                 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 29, 1996), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/erdemovic/tjug/en/erd-tsj961129e.pdf; Prosecutor 
v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-Tbis-R117, Sentencing Judgment, paras. 7-9 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 11, 1999), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/tjug/en/tad-tsj991111e.pdf). 
36 Prosecutor v. Plavšić, Case No. IT-00-39&40/1-S, Sentencing 
Judgment, paras. 66-70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 27, 2003), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/plavsic/tjug/en/pla-tj030227e.pdf. 
37  See NANCY COMBS, GUILTY PLEAS IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
LAW: CONSTRUCTING A RESTORATIVE JUSTICE APPROACH (2007) [hereinafter 
COMBS, GUILTY PLEAS], for further discussion on plea-bargaining at international 
tribunals. 
38 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kamuhanda, Case No. ICTR-95-54A-T, 
Judgment and Sentence, para. 754 (Jan. 22, 2004),  
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/Kamuhanda/decisions/220104.p
df; Prosecutor v. Furundžija, Trial Judgment, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, para. 288 
(Dec. 10, 1998), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/furundzija/tjug/en/fur-
tj981210e.pdf. 
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from the law’s main business: to weigh the charges brought against 
the accused, to render judgment, and to mete out due punishment.”39 
I. SENTENCING OBJECTIVES ADVANCED BY INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS 
What justifies international criminal justice mechanisms like 
the ICC and its recent predecessors like the United Nations 
International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and the former 
Yugoslavia? This is a question that the ICTY and ICTR never really 
settled. Over time, they advanced an impressive array of “functions” 
of international criminal courts.40 Some of these functions are similar 
to justifications for punishment found in domestic systems, such as 
retribution, deterrence, and rehabilitation.41 Others are proffered as 
                                                 
39 HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE 
BANALITY OF EVIL 253 (1964). 
40 See supra, notes 19-20. See Teitel, The Law and Politics of Contemporary 
Transitional Justice, supra note 25, at 857-58; Richard A. Wilson, Judging History: The 
Historical Record of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 27 HUM. 
RTS. Q. 908, 908 (2005); Nemitz, The Law of Sentencing in International Criminal Law, 
supra note 25, at 92-97. For a critique of sentencing rationales in international 
criminal law, see generally the following: Andrew K. Woods, Moral Judgments & 
International Crimes: The Disutility of Desert, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 633, 640 (2012); Mirjan 
Damaska, What is the Point of International Criminal Justice?, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
329, 353 (2008); Robert Sloane, The Expressive Capacity of International Punishment: The 
Limits of the National Law Analogy and the Potential of International Criminal Law, 43 
STAN. J. INT’L L. 39, 43 (2007). For arguments on how the approach of the ICTR 
to jurisprudential issues regarding genocide can undermine Rwandan reconciliation, 
see Jean Marie Kamatali, The Challenge of Linking International Criminal Justice and 
National Reconciliation: the Case of the ICTR, 16 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 115, 121-24 (2003). 
41 Michele Cotton, Back with a Vengeance: The Resilience of Retribution as an 
Articulated Purpose of Criminal Punishment, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1313, 1313 (2000). 
See Damaska, What is the Point, supra note 40. See also Prosecutor v. Rutaganira, Case 
No. ICTR-95-1C-T, Judgment, paras. 108-09 (Mar. 14, 2005), 
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/Rutaganira/judgement/050314.p
df; Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR-97-23-S, Judgement and Sentence, 
para. 28 (Sept. 4, 1998), 
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/Kambanda/decisions/kambanda.
pdf. 
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“special” or “unique” to international criminal law, such as 
reconciliation and preventing revisionism.42 
The vision of international criminal justice that is prioritized 
will crucially shape the character of the ICC. Identifying a primary 
justification for international criminal law, of course, does not mean 
that ICL cannot make a meaningful contribution to other goals. 
However, it is imperative that the ICC coalesces around a primary 
justification for its work and set modest expectations. An idealism 
that avoids prioritizing goals and eagerly pursues them all can only 
delay the inevitable choice, as the experience of ad hoc international 
criminal tribunals reveals, because some of these objectives are in 
conflict. Eventually international judges are forced to prioritize. This 
article hopes to inform that decision-making process by evaluating 
the consequences of that choice through an examination of the 
sentencing jurisprudence and practice of international tribunals. 
A. Developing a Framework: Paucity of Positive Law 
Almost exactly fifty years to the day, a three judge trial 
chamber of the ICTY issued the first sentence by an international 
criminal tribunal for atrocity crimes since the International Military 
Tribunal for the Far East punished military and political leaders of 
the Empire of Japan following World War II. When the three judges, 
who were from France, Costa Rica, and Egypt, gathered in The 
Hague, in a building that formerly housed an insurance company, to 
deliberate on a just punishment for a war criminal, they found that 
“[n]either the Statute nor the Report of the Secretary-General nor the 
Rules elaborate on the objectives sought by imposing such a 
sentence.”43 In identifying justifications for punishment and aims of 
                                                 
42 Janine Natalya Clark, The Limits of Retributive Justice: Findings of an 
Empirical Study in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 7 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 463, 474-75 (2009). 
43 Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Case No. IT-96-22-T, Sentencing 
Judgement, para. 57 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 29, 1996), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/erdemovic/tjug/en/erd-tsj961129e.pdf. See also Uwe 
Ewald, ‘Predictably Irrational’ – International Sentencing and its Discourse against the 
Backdrop of Preliminary Empirical Findings on ICTY Sentencing Practices, 10 INT’L CRIM. 
L. REV. 365, 379 (2010) (“The rather thin normative framework provided by the 
sentencing provisions of the Statute and Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the 
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sentencing in international criminal law, international judges have 
drawn largely from four sources: (1) the preamble of the Security 
Counsel Resolution establishing the ICTY and ICTR; (2) penal 
theories from national law; (3) the Nuremberg legacy, and (4) human 
rights norms. 
The preamble provisions of Security Council Resolutions 
establishing the ICTY and ICTR are primarily intended to set forth 
the legal basis for Security Council action under Chapter VII 
pursuant to the U.N. Charter.44 It is doubtful that they were intended 
as instructions for judges at the time of sentencing. Nevertheless, the 
methodology of the International Tribunals has been to turn to these 
provisions in their respective constitutive Resolutions to formulate 
objectives of international sentencing.45 This methodology assumes 
that the conditions required to trigger the Security Council’s powers 
under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter would suffice for developing 
the justification and purpose of punishment of perpetrators of 
atrocity crimes.46 It also assumes that the reasons supporting 
international prosecutions are one and the same as the rationales to 
guide its sentencing practice. In connection with establishing the 
ICTY, Security Council Resolution 808 states: 
Determined to put an end to such crimes and to take 
effective measures to bring to justice the persons who 
are responsible for them, 
                                                 
ICTY does not offer a consistent philosophical approach to international 
sentencing.”). 
44 While there is a natural overlap between the justification for 
international prosecutions and the object and purpose of international sentencing, 
they cannot be assumed to be identical. Unfortunately, this distinction and its 
relevance to international sentencing cannot be pursued in the short context of this 
contribution. See H. L. A. HART, Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment, in 
PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 1 (2d ed. 2008). See also Margaret M. 
deGuzman, Choosing to Prosecute, supra note 16, at 288-89 (making a distinction 
between justifications for the establishment of the International Criminal Court and 
rationales to guide case selection). 
45 E.g. Prosecutor v. Kamuhanda, Judgment and Sentence, supra note 38, 
at paras. 753-54. 
46 Prosecutor v. Kamuhanda, Judgment and Sentence, supra note 38, at 
paras. 753-54. 
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Convinced that in the particular circumstances of the 
former Yugoslavia the establishment of an 
international tribunal would enable this aim to be 
achieved and would contribute to the restoration and 
maintenance of peace.47 
Likewise, Security Council Resolution 955, establishing the 
ICTR, states: 
Determined to put an end to such crimes and to take 
effective measures to bring to justice the persons who 
are responsible for them, 
Convinced that in the particular circumstances of 
Rwanda, the prosecution of persons responsible for 
serious violations of international humanitarian law 
would enable this aim to be achieved and would 
contribute to the process of national reconciliation 
and to the restoration and maintenance of peace.48 
Both Resolutions speak to the Security Council’s 
determination “to put an end to” international crimes, such as 
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, and “to bring to 
justice” the perpetrators. Furthermore, the Resolutions proclaim the 
Security Council’s conviction that international prosecutions “would 
enable this aim to be achieved.” Presumably, “this aim” refers to 
what was mentioned in the previous paragraph: “to put an end to 
such crimes” and “to bring to justice the persons” responsible. Thus, 
in the opinion of the Security Council, international prosecutions 
would “put an end to” international crimes and “bring to justice” the 
perpetrators. Moreover, the Security Council is also convinced that 
prosecution “would contribute to the restoration and maintenance of 
peace.” While some ICTY judges have relied on this particular phrase 
to claim that the court’s purpose is to promote national 
                                                 
47 S.C. Res. 808, 48th Year, S/RES/808 (Feb. 22, 1993). See also S.C. Res. 
827, supra note 34. . 
48 S.C. Res. 955, supra note 34, at paras. 1-2. 
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reconciliation,49 it is doubtful that this was the intent. This language is 
boilerplate and appears in every resolution that invokes Security 
Council’s enforcement powers under Chapter VII. It is necessary to 
set for the legal basis of the Council’s use of Chapter VII. 
Interestingly, while Resolutions 808 and 827 are silent regarding 
reconciliation, Resolution 955 establishing the ICTR explicitly 
mentions “national reconciliation” as part of the ICTR’s mandate.50 
Although Tribunal judges routinely turn to their respective 
resolutions to formulate sentencing rationales, their judgments do not 
address important differences in the texts of these resolutions.51 
B. Extraordinary Crimes, Ordinary Objectives: Retribution and 
Deterrence 
Although the sentencing jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals 
has never adequately distinguished between a justification for 
punishment versus the aims of punishment, the initial cases identified 
two primary purposes: retribution and deterrence.52 A number of 
years later, the Blaškić Trial Chamber added rehabilitation and 
protection of society to the primary purposes of ICL sentencing, but 
                                                 
49 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 43, 
at para. 58; Prosecutor v. Plavšić, Sentencing Judgement, supra note 36, at para. 79.  
50 S.C. Res. 955, supra note 34, at paras. 1-2. 
51 There is some concern that the judges may not have even noticed 
these differences. For example, Judge Inés Monica Weinberg de Roca opines about 
the “identical formulation” of resolutions establishing the ad hoc Tribunals. See Inés 
Monica Weinberg de Roca & Christopher M. Rassi, Sentencing and Incarceration in the 
Ad Hoc Tribunals, 44 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1, 2 (2008). 
52 See Prosecutor v. Tadić, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 35,at paras. 7-
9 (stating that “retribution and deterrence serving as the primary purposes of 
sentence”); Prosecutor v. Furundžija, supra note 38, at para. 288. For more recent 
cases, see Prosecutor v. Deronjić, Case No. IT-02-61-S, Sentencing Judgment, para. 
142 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar 30, 2004), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/deronjic/tjug/en/sj-040330e.pdf (concluding that 
the “[f]undamental principles taken into consideration when imposing a sentence 
are deterrence and retribution”). For cases from the ICTR, see also Prosecutor v. 
Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-T, Judgment and Sentence, para. 455 (Dec. 6, 
1999), 
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/Rutaganda/judgement/991206.p
df and Prosecutor v. Serushago, Case No. ICTR-98-39-S, Sentence, para. 20 (Feb. 
5, 1999), 
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/Serushago/decisions/os1.pdf. 
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it did so without explanation or analysis.53 These “four parameters” –
retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation, and protection of society – 
mirror the rationalizations for sentencing found at the national 
level.54 However, scholars contest the applicability and relevance of 
these rationales to international criminal justice.55 As the sentencing 
jurisprudence developed, retribution and deterrence emerged as the 
primary rationales in ICL punishment.56 Some observers criticize 
                                                 
53 See Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgment, para. 761 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 3, 2000), 
http://icty.org/x/cases/blaskic/tjug/en/bla-tj000303e.pdf. 
54 Id. 
55 See, e.g., MARK A. DRUMBL, ATROCITY, PUNISHMENT AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 149 (2007); David Luban, Fairness to Rightness: Jurisdiction, 
Legality, and the Legitimacy of International Criminal Law, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 569, 575-77 (Samantha Besson & John Tasioulas eds., 2010); 
Margaret M. deGuzman, Choosing to Prosecute supra note 16, at 301-12; Damaska, 
What is the Point, supra note 40, at 339-40; Sloane, The Expressive Capacity of 
International Punishment, supra note 40, at 50-51; Diane Marie Amann, Group Mentality, 
Expressivism, and Genocide, 2 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 93, 116 (2002); Nemitz, The Law of 
Sentencing in International Criminal Law, supra note 25. 
56 See Prosecutor v. Popović, Case No. IT-05-88-T, Trial Judgment, para. 
2128 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 10, 2010); Prosecutor v. 
Lukić, Case No. IT-05-87 Trial Judgment, para. 1049 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia July 20, 2009); Prosecutor v. Milutinović, Case No. IT-05-87-T, 
Trial Judgement, para. 1144 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 26, 
2009); Prosecutor v Delić, Case No 1T-04-83-T, Trial Judgment, para. 559 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 15, 2008); Prosecutor v. Milošević, 
Case No IT-98-29/1-T, Trial Judgment, para. 987 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Dec. 12, 2007); Prosecutor v. Martić, Case No. 95-11-T, Trial 
Judgment, para. 484 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 12, 2007); 
Prosecutor v Zelenović, Case No IT-96-23/2-S, Sentencing Judgment, para. 31 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 4, 2007); Prosecutor v. Krajišnik, 
Case No IT-00-39&40-T, Trial Judgment, para. 1134 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Sept. 27, 2006); Prosecutor v. Orić, Case No 1T-03-68-T, Trial 
Judgment, para. 718 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 30, 2006); 
Prosecutor v. Limaj, Case No 1T-03-66-T, Trial Judgment, para. 723 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 30, 2005); Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No 
IT-01-42-T, Trial Judgment, para. 458 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 
Jan. 31, 2005); Prosecutor v Blagojević, Case No IT-02-60-T, Trial Judgment, para. 
817 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 17, 2005); Prosecutor v. 
Deronjić, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 52, at paras. 142-50; Prosecutor v. 
Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Trial Judgment, paras. 900-02 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
the Former Yugoslavia July 31, 2003); Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23-T 
Trial Judgment, para. 838 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 22, 
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ICL’s focus on retribution and deterrence, hallmarks of a national 
system’s response to ordinary crimes, as an unimaginative and 
unoriginal response to atrocity crimes.57 Modesty, however, may be a 
safeguard for a nascent international justice system. Ambitious social 
engineering in the wake of mass atrocities is wisely left to other social 
processes and institutions. Legalism has its limits, and those limits 
should be respected. Its formality, rigidity, and obligation to protect 
the rights of parties make it a limited agent of social change. These 
meta-juridical goals require a matrix of social and spiritual institutions 
working together to rebuild the fabric of society post-atrocity. When 
other institutions and agents of society share this responsibility, 
international criminal justice can play a modest but important role. 
Of course, this is not intended to suggest that deterrence or 
retribution are easy goals, but they are more familiar to a criminal 
justice mechanism. According to the Tribunal, the goal of general 
deterrence implies that “[t]he sentence imposed must also be 
sufficient in order to dissuade others from committing the same 
crime.”58 Individual deterrence, on the other hand, “refers to the 
                                                 
2001); Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No IT-95-14-T, Trial Judgment, para. 762 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 3, 2000); Prosecutor v Kupreškić, Case 
No IT-95-16-T, Trial Judgment, para. 848 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Jan. 14, 2000); Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Sentencing Judgment, supra 
note 43, paras. 58, 64; Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No IT-94-1-Tbis-R117, Sentencing 
Judgment, paras. 7-9 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 11, 1999); 
Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-A, Appeals Judgment, para. 402 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 22, 2006), 
http://icty.org/x/cases/stakic/acjug/en/sta-aj060322e.pdf; Prosecutor v. Delalić, 
Case No. IT-96-21-A, Appeals Judgement, para. 806 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Feb. 20, 2001), http://icty.org/x/cases/mucic/acjug/en/cel-
aj010220.pdf; Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-A, Appeal Judgment, 
para. 185 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 24, 2000), 
http://icty.org/x/cases/aleksovski/acjug/en/ale-asj000324e.pdf; Prosecutor v. 
Milutinović, Case No. IT-05-87-T, Trial Judgment Vol. 3, paras. 1144-45 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 26, 2009), 
http://icty.org/x/cases/milutinovic/tjug/en/jud090226-e3of4.  
57 See, e.g., Drumbl, Collective Violence, supra note 29, at 610. 
58 Prosecutor v. Nikolić, Case No. IT-94-2-S, Trial Sentencing Judgment, 
para. 136 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 18, 2003), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/dragan_nikolic/tjug/en/nik-sj031218e.pdf; 
Prosecutor v. Todorović, Case No. IT 95-9/1-S, Sentencing Judgment, para. 30 
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specific effect of the sentence upon the accused” sitting in judgment 
before the court.59 The “sentence should be adequate to discourage 
an accused from recidivism.”60 In other words, the punishment 
should discourage an accused from re-offending after the sentence 
has been served and the accused has been released.61 
The general jurisprudence of the Appeals Chamber affirms 
that the objective of deterrence, both general and specific, may 
influence the sentence.62 However, it has also cautioned: “this factor 
must not be accorded undue prominence in the overall assessment of 
the sentences to be imposed on persons convicted by the 
International Tribunal.”63 ICTY trial chambers recognize both 
specific and general deterrence have “an important function in 
principle” and serve “an important goal of sentencing.”64 Some trial 
chambers have applied the term “individual” deterrence when 
referring to specific deterrence.65 Other trial chambers rejected the 
applicability of specific deterrence in international criminal justice. 
For example, although the Trial Chamber in the Dragan Nikolić case 
recognized that specific deterrence “has an important function in 
principle and serves as an important goal of sentencing,”66 it 
                                                 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 31, 2001), 
http://icty.org/x/cases/todorovic/tjug/en/tod-tj010731e.pdf. 
59 Prosecutor v. Nikolić, Trial Sentencing Judgment, supra note 58, at 
para. 135. 
60 Prosecutor v. Nikolić, Case No. IT-94-2A, Appeals Sentencing 
Judgment, para. 45 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 4, 2005). 
61 Prosecutor v. Nikolić, Trial Sentencing Judgment, supra note 58, at 
para. 134. 
62 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A & IT-94-1-A bis, 
Appeal Sentencing Judgment, para. 48 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 
Jan. 26, 2000), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acjug/en/tad-asj000126e.pdf; 
Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-A, Appeals Judgment, para. 185 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 24, 2000), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/aleksovski/acjug/en/ale-asj000324e.pdf; Prosecutor 
v. Nikolić, Appeals Sentencing Judgment, supra note 60, at paras. 45-46. 
63 Prosecutor v. Tadić, Appeal Sentencing Judgment, supra note 62, at 
para. 48. 
64 Prosecutor v. Nikolić, Trial Sentencing Judgment, supra note 58, at 
para. 134. 
65 Id. at paras. 134-35. 
66 Id. at para. 134. 
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nevertheless found that specific deterrence had no relevance in the 
case before it.67 The court did not elaborate on why it found that 
specific deterrence has no relevance to the punishment of Dragon 
Nikolić. The judges perhaps concluded that the aim of specifically 
deterring Nikolić from committing crimes against humanity is moot, 
assuming the circumstances that provided an opportunity for these 
crimes to be committed, namely war, will not be present when the 
accused is released. 
Outside the tribunals, opinions are split on whether 
international prosecutions have any deterrent value. Professor Payam 
Akhavan argues that mass atrocities are the product of “elite-
induced” violence aimed at the acquisition or preservation of 
power.68 Leaders are making calculated choices and trade-offs and 
engaging in an immoral cost-benefit analysis. Akhavan makes a 
compelling case that political power gained through fomenting ethnic 
hatred resulting in mass violence can be discouraged. Threat of 
punishment and international stigmatization “can increase the costs 
of a policy that is criminal under international law.”69 According to 
Akhavan, this can in turn impact the calculations of leaders 
contemplating engagement in criminal policies such as ethnic 
cleansing, genocide, or crimes against humanity as a viable policy for 
sustaining power.70 Most supporters of deterrence in ICL 
acknowledge that some individuals may not easily be dissuaded from 
committing crimes when surrounded by routine cruelty. However, 
they maintain that punishment can be an effective deterrent in 
preventing such deviant contexts prior to their occurrence, or 
recurrence, in post-conflict situations.71 
                                                 
67 Id. at para. 135. 
68 Payam Akhavan, Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal Justice Prevent 
Future Atrocities?, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 7, 12 (2001). 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 Generally see the following: Akhavan, Beyond Impunity, supra note 68; 
Rolf Einar Fife, Penalties, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING 
OF THE ROME STATUTE, 211-36 (Roy S. Lee ed.,1999); Dominic McGoldrick, The 
Permanent International Criminal Court: An End to the Culture of Impunity?, CRIM. L. 
REV., Aug. 1999, at 627; M. Cherif Bassioiuni, Searching for Peace and Achieving Justice: 
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Others are much more skeptical about the deterrent capacity 
of international prosecutions.72 Professor Jan Klabbers, for example, 
takes the position that ICL will not play a significant deterrent role 
because human rights violators cannot be deterred.73 He argues that 
the cost-benefit analysis underlying the deterrence argument 
advanced by Akhavan and others cannot be applied to human rights 
violators because they act mainly for political reasons. Because they 
willfully engage in mass murder for political motives, Klabbers 
considers them undeterrable. But there is no reason to assume that 
political motivations are beyond deterrence. As Professor Isaac 
Ehrlich observes, “willful engagement in even the most reprehensible 
violations of legal and moral codes does not preclude an ability to 
make self-serving choices.”74 In sum, while the scholarship is divided 
on the deterrent capacity of international criminal law, tribunal judges 
nevertheless consider deterrence as a central purpose of international 
prosecution and claim that it is an influential factor in their 
sentencing decisions. 
C. The Lip Service to Rehabilitation 
One sentencing purpose proffered by international criminal 
tribunals that appears to have no impact on sentencing allocations is 
rehabilitation. International human rights treaties encourage 
rehabilitation considerations in national penology.75 While the focus 
of these treaties appears to be on the administration of prisons and 
                                                 
the Need for Accountability, 59 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9 (1996), for support of 
deterrence in ICL. 
72 Jan Klabbers, Just Revenge? The Deterrence Argument in International 
Criminal Law, 7 FIN. Y.B. INT’L L. 249 (2001) (disagreeing that human rights 
violators can be deterred); Drumbl, Collective Violence, supra note 29, at 610 (claiming 
that there is little or no evidence that punishment deters perpetrators of mass 
atrocities). 
73 Klabbers, Just Revenge?, supra note 72, at 253. 
74 Isaac Ehrlich, Crime, Punishment, and the Market for Offenses, 10 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 43, 43 (1996). 
75 See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 10(3), 
Dec. 16, 1966, S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-20, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967), 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
(“The penitentiary system shall comprise treatment of prisoners the essential aim of 
which shall be their reformation and social rehabilitation”); U.N. GAOR, 47th 
Sess., cmt., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.3 (1992); American Convention 
on Human Rights, art. 5(6), Nov. 21, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 143. 
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the manner of enforcement of a sentence,76 the ICTY has purported 
to consider such provisions when determining the length of the 
sentence itself.77 
In the early sentencing jurisprudence of the ICTY, several 
trial chambers stated that rehabilitation is one of the “four 
parameters” that guide international sentencing.78 However, it is fair 
to say that rehabilitation was never highly significant79 in the 
determination of a sentence and did not act as a meaningful 
“parameter” to limit the sentence. This was made apparent in the 
Trial Chamber’s judgment of General Blaškić.80 Despite 
acknowledging “rehabilitation” as one of the parameters guiding its 
determination of Blaškić’s sentence, and despite its own factual 
finding strongly indicating the possibility of rehabilitation in the case 
of General Blaskic, the Trial Chamber nevertheless decided to not 
give these factors any weight, and certainly its forty-five-year sentence 
leaves little trace of rehabilitation considerations, especially since 
Blaskic was forty years old when he was sentenced.81 Such a sentence 
suggests that the Tribunal was eager to send a strong signal of 
deterrence, and that this ideology predominated its sentencing 
considerations, even to the extent, some would argue, of trial 
chambers distributing exemplary sentences or exemplary justice and 
placing that foremost in their considerations. Taking caution that this 
practice did not go too far, the Appeals Chamber stated in one of its 
judgments that “this factor [deterrence] must not be accorded undue 
                                                 
76 See, e.g., MANFRED NOWAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND 
POLITICAL RIGHTS, 241-54 (Kehl am Rheine ed., 2d rev. ed. 2005). 
77 Prosecutor v. Delalić, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Appeals Judgment, paras. 
805-06 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 20, 2001), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/mucic/acjug/en/cel-aj010220.pdf. 
78 Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgment para. 761, 765 
(Mar. 3, 2000), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/blaskic/tjug/en/bla-tj000303e.pdf 
(discussing rehabilitation). 
79  Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Case No. IT 96-22-Tbis, Sentencing 
Judgment, para. 66 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 5, 1998), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/erdemovic/tjug/en/erd-tsj980305e.pdf. 
80 Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Judgment, supra note 78, at para. 762. 
81 Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Judgment, supra note 78, at para. 762. See 
Shahram Dana, Revisiting the Blaškić Sentence: Some Reflections on the Sentencing 
Jurisprudence of the ICTY, 4 INT’L CR. L. REV. 321 (2004), for a critique of the Trial 
Chamber’s sentencing analysis in the Blaškić case.  
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prominence in the overall assessment of the sentences.”82 It has 
likewise explicitly pronounced that “rehabilitation should not be 
given undue weight, confirming what was already implicit in the 
sentencing practice of earlier cases.”83 
D. The Rise of Judicial Idealism: Enter Reconciliation & Social 
Engineering 
The U.N. Security Council resolution establishing the ICTY 
does not mention “reconciliation” as such. Neither does the ICTY 
Statute or its Rules of Procedure and Evidence (RPE). Likewise, the 
preamble and statute of the ICC avoid incorporation of reconciliation 
as a goal of international prosecutions. Furthermore, reconciliation 
ideology is virtually absent in the early practice of the ad hoc 
Tribunals.84 Even in the first few cases involving guilty pleas and plea 
bargains, international judges did not justify sentencing discounts in 
terms of promoting reconciliation.85 The practice of justifying plea 
deals in terms of reconciliation became popular only much later. This 
is not to be confused with judicial unawareness of the potential 
contribution that international prosecutions and just punishments 
could make towards reconciliation in a post-conflict society.86 The 
                                                 
82 Prosecutor v. Tadić, Appeal Sentencing Judgment, supra note 62, at 
para. 48. 
83 See Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-A, Judgment, para. 806 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 20, 2001) 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/mucic/acjug/en/cel-aj010220.pdf (stating that 
“although rehabilitation (in accordance with international human rights standards) 
should be considered as a relevant factor, it is not one which should be given 
undue weight”). 
84 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Judgment and Sentence, supra note 
41; Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 43; Prosecutor v. 
Tadić, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 35; Prosecutor v. Sikirica, Case No. IT-95-
8-S, Sentencing Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 13, 
2001), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/sikirica/tjug/en/sik-tsj011113e.pdf. 
85 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 43; 
Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Judgment and Sentence, supra note 41; Prosecutor v. 
Sikirica, Sententing Judgment, supra note 84. 
86 In the first annual report to the Security Council, the ICTY President 
Antonio Cassese noted that international criminal justice mechanisms can promote 
reconciliation and restore “true peace.” See President of the Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 1st Ann. Rep. of the Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
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initial judges of the ad hoc Tribunals were mindful of this potential, 
but did not consider it as a differential principle for the purpose of 
allocating punishment.87 This is most likely because reconciliation is 
largely unmeasured, slow building and aspirational.88 Successful 
reconciliation requires the mobilization of diverse elements of social 
and legal order. Justice through criminal prosecution of violators of 
community norms is merely one step towards that goal. 
Although reconciliation is an important goal,89 the first 
generation of international criminal law judges understood it could 
not be captured by legalism or transformed into an operational rule 
or principle.90 The very nature of mass atrocities problematizes 
achieving grand ambitions like reconciliation because the widespread 
participation in atrocity crimes creates deep complicity that is not 
easily overcome through the narrow lens of judicially constructed 
narratives via international criminal justice mechanisms. Moreover, 
international judges were initially hesitant to act as arbiters of history 
or to develop judicial narratives of the background to the conflict 
that would serve as a platform for reconciliation.91 
                                                 
Yugoslavia in Accordance with Article 34 of Security Council Resolution 25704 annex (1993), 
transmitted by Note of the Secretary-General, paras. 14-18, U.N. Doc. S/1994/1007 (Aug. 
29, 1994) [hereinafter Note of Secretary-General: Rep. of ICTY]; See also Wald, The 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Comes of Age, supra note 23 
(discussing reconciliation through judicial adjudication).  
87 Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 43, at paras. 
57-66 (discussing factors influencing sentence allocation but not treating 
reconciliation as a sentencing factor). See also Wald, The International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia Comes of Age, supra note 23, at 117. 
88 See Perry, A Survey of Reconciliation, supra note 26, at 207, 208 (Joanna R. 
Quinn ed., 2009). 
89 See Note of Secretary-General: Rep. of ICTY, supra note 86, at para. 16. 
90 See Wald, The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
Comes of Age, supra note 23, at 117 (concluding that “‘adjudication’ by ICTY of who 
started, prolonged, or ended the war and why in the context of criminal 
proceedings without the states themselves having input is basically unfair, or at 
least does not contribute to future reconciliation”). See also Prosecutor v. 
Erdemović, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 43; Prosecutor v. Kambanda, 
Judgment and Sentence, supra note 41; Prosecutor v. Sikirica, Sentencing Judgment, 
supra note 84.  
91 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Delalić, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Trial Judgment, 
para. 88 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 1998), 
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Reconciliation subsequently gained traction in the Tribunals’ 
jurisprudence when an increasing number of convictions were 
secured by plea bargains. However, with plea bargains, the historical 
narrative of “what happened” was no longer constructed in open and 
public courts by documentation and witnesses to the atrocities, as 
was done at Nuremburg,92 but behind closed doors in negotiations 
between perpetrators and international lawyers.93 In sentencing 
judgments following a guilty plea or plea bargain, reconciliation 
became a useful ideology to legitimize plea deals and justify 
sentencing discounts.94 While actors within the system view 
sentencing reductions as a normal outcome of plea bargains,95 local 
populations, especially where plea bargaining is foreign to the 
domestic legal culture, view the sentencing reduction as political 
favoritism to a particular ethnic group, unwillingness of elites to hold 
other elites accountable, failure to acknowledge the suffering and 
                                                 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/mucic/tjug/en/981116_judg_en.pdf. (stating that 
the “Trial Chamber does not consider it necessary to enter into a lengthy discussion 
of the political and historical background to these events, nor a general analysis of 
the conflict”).  
92 Notwithstanding the fact that the “role of criminal tribunals as arbiters 
of historical truth has been contested since the first serious efforts of international 
justice, at Nuremberg and Tokyo.” See SCHABAS, UNIMAGINABLE ATROCITIES, 
supra note 17, at 157. 
93 For concerns that plea-bargaining distorts the historical record, see 
COMBS, GUILTY PLEAS, supra note 37, at 67, 207.  
94 See Prosecutor v. Plavšić, Sentencing Judgement, supra note 36; 
Prosecutor v. Bralo, Case No. IT-95-17-A, Judgment on Sentencing Appeal (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 2, 2007), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/bralo/acjug/en/bra-aj070402-e.pdf; Prosecutor v. 
Nikolic, Case No. IT-94-2-S, Sentencing Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Dec. 18, 2003), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/dragan_nikolic/tjug/en/nik-sj031218e.pdf; 
Prosecutor v. Bralo, Case No. IT-95-17-S, Sentencing Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. 
for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 7, 2005), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/bralo/tjug/en/bra-sj051207-e.pdf. 
95 Tribunal lawyers from civil law countries were initially concerned 
about the practice of plea-bargaining. See Nancy A. Combs, Copping a Plea to 
Genocide: The Plea Bargaining of International Crimes, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 139-41, 53 
(2002) (reporting that judges and lawyers from civil law countries were 
uncomfortable with plea bargaining at international tribunals).  
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injustice inflicted on victim communities, or secretive deal-making.96 
Thus, the entrenchment of reconciliation ideology in ICL 
jurisprudence is largely a reactionary effort to legitimize the practice 
of plea bargaining in the face of mounting criticism. 
Crucially, for this push back to be successful, the goal of 
reconciliation needed to be firmly anchored in the Tribunal’s 
mandate. The problem facing the judges, however, was that Security 
Council Resolution 827, establishing the ICTY, did not position 
reconciliation as a teleological imperative.97 In fact, the resolution 
does not even mention the word “reconciliation,” thus calling into 
question whether reconciliation ideology should be considered as part 
of the Tribunal’s mandate.98 Nevertheless, some ICTY judges took it 
upon themselves to inject the goal of reconciliation into the court’s 
mandate through a flawed interpretation of Resolution 827 that, even 
if well intended, was beyond the Tribunal’s mandate and institutional 
capacity. They attempted to situate the Tribunal’s role in promoting 
reconciliation within Resolution 827’s reference to “contribute to the 
restoration and maintenance of peace.”99 Unfortunately, this 
methodology suffers from over dependence on the unlikely 
assumption that, by such preambular declarations, the Security 
Council intended to articulate a philosophy to guide international 
sentencing.100 Even if we accept the assumptions necessary for this 
interpretation, this language fails to justify the emphasis given to the 
notion of reconciliation in ICL sentencing practice, resulting 
frequently in perversely lenient sentences. Arguably, restoration and 
maintenance of peace, in this context (i.e. criminal justice forum), 
require the realization of justice by accountability for crimes and fair 
punishment for wrongdoing. Thus, even assuming that reconciliation 
is part of the Tribunal’s mandate, a difficult question follows: what 
                                                 
96 Cf. Stephanos Bibas & William W. Burke-White, International Idealism 
Meets Domestic-Criminal-Procedure Realism, 59 DUKE L.J. 637, 658–60 (2010).  
97 See S.C. Res. 827, supra note 34. 
98 See Clark, The Limits of Retributive Justice, supra note 42, at 465 
(challenging the merits of reconciliation and historical record building as goals of 
international criminal justice mechanisms). 
99 S.C. Res. 827, supra note 34, at 1. 
100 The assumption also requires us to ignore the more obvious and 
immediate purpose of such declarations in the preamble, namely to trigger the 
Security Council’s coercive powers under Chapter VII.  
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impact, if any, should the aim of reconciliation have in the 
determination of a sentence for international crimes? 
The complexities and difficulties of advancing reconciliation 
ideology as part of the core mandate of the Tribunal were not fully 
appreciated when it gained traction as a justification for the 
increasing practice of plea-bargaining. Nevertheless, the notion of 
reconciliation now appears frequently, but largely perfunctory, in 
sentencing judgments.101 Despite its absence from the court’s 
constitutive documents, the extant practice among ICTY judges is to 
cursorily identify “promoting reconciliation” as part of the Tribunal’s 
mandate. Thus, romanticism about international tribunals 
“promoting reconciliation” persists even though it remains elusively 
conceptually and pragmatically.102 While the Tribunals have clarified 
how concepts such as “retribution” and “deterrence” are to be 
understood in the context of international criminal justice, the notion 
of “reconciliation” has remained undefined. Tribunal judges have 
struggled to coherently develop and integrate this concept in their 
decision-making and sentencing judgments.103 The lack of clarity on 
what “reconciliation” means for international criminal justice, 
however, has not inhibited trial chambers from relying on it when 
allocating a sentence. Unfortunately, they have misapplied the notion 
of reconciliation in their sentencing judgments. As discussed in detail 
below, the ICTY’s method of realizing reconciliation appears to 
contradict the aim of combating impunity, which is explicitly part of 
the Tribunal’s mandate. 
                                                 
101 Prosecutor v. Babic, Case No. IT-03-72-S, Sentencing Judgment (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 29, 2004), 
http://icty.org/x/cases/babic/tjug/en/bab-sj040629e.pdf; Prosecutor v. Banovic, 
Case No. IT-02-65/1-S, Sentencing Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Oct. 28, 2003), http://icty.org/x/cases/banovic/tjug/en/ban-
sj031028e.pdf; Prosecutor v. Mrda, Case No. IT-02-59-S (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Mar. 31, 2004), http://icty.org/x/cases/mrda/tjug/en/sj-
040331.pdf. 
102 See Clark, The Limits of Retributive Justice, supra note 42, at 465 
(challenging the merits of reconciliation and historical record building as goals of 
international criminal justice mechanisms). 
103 See Kamatali, The Challenge of Linking International Criminal Justice, supra 
note 40, at 121-24, for arguments on how the ICTR’s approach to jurisprudential 
issues regarding genocide can undermine Rwandan reconciliation. 
 2014 Dana 3:1 
59 
E. Didactic Function of International Prosecutions: Affirmative 
Prevention 
Some of the objectives of punishment for atrocity crimes as 
articulated by the ad hoc tribunals mirror those found at the national 
level, such as deterrence, retribution, rehabilitation, and protection of 
society.104 In addition, other considerations influence sentencing 
allocations in the international context such as national reconciliation, 
preserving history, and maintaining peace.105 Another important 
consideration in the international context is reinforcing the values of 
the international community.106 The work of international courts 
contributes to internalizing norms, values, and interests protected by 
international law in the consciousness and culture of national and 
international actors. An important step in the evolution of the global 
legal order is the crystallization of universal norms as more than mere 
soft law provisions, but rather as binding law backed by punishment 
for violations, especially norms embedded in human rights treaties, 
international humanitarian law conventions, and the Genocide 
Convention. 
Referred to by some commentators as the didactic 
function,107 in the context of international criminal justice this 
                                                 
104 Damaska, What is the Point, supra note 40, at 331, 339. See also 
Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T, Trial Judgment, para. 458 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 31, 2005), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/strugar/tjug/en/str-tj050131e.pdf. 
105 See Prosecutor v. Rukundo, Case No. ICTR-2001-70-T, Judgment, 
para. 600 (Feb. 27, 2009), 
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case%5CEnglish%5CRukundo%5C090227.pdf; 
Prosecutor v. Perišić, Case No. IT-04-81-T, Trial Judgment, para. 1802 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 6, 2011), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/perisic/tjug/en/110906_judgement.pdf; Prosecutor 
v. Strugar, Trial Judgment, supra note 104, at para. 163. 
106 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Nikolić, Trial Sentencing Judgment, supra note 
58, at para. 139; Amann, Group Mentality, Expressivism, and Genocide, supra note 55, at 
95, 118-19, 127, 132. 
107 Damaska, What is the Point, supra note 40, at 347. Related to didactic 
function is the expressive function. See MARK A. DRUMBL, ATROCITY, supra note 
55, at 173-76; Luban, Fairness to Rightness, supra note 55, at 569, 576-77; Amann, 
Group Mentality, Expressivism, and Genocide, supra note 55, at 95; Margaret M. 
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translates into building awareness of the distinction between legal and 
criminal conduct during war or armed conflict, whether international 
or non-international in character. At first blush, this aim may appear 
rather simplistic. After all, the line between legal and criminal 
conduct is rather obvious when considering murder, rape, torture, 
and other such crimes that occur in the context of armed conflict. 
However, crimes committed in these situations are often precipitated 
by direct and implicit indoctrination that dehumanizes the victim. 
Coupled with the awareness that war crimes historically go 
unpunished, these forces converge to disease belligerents with a 
“culture of inverse morality”108 where killing, raping, and terrorizing 
civilians becomes an accepted part of the warfare itself. 
An individual’s inner sense of morality and repulsion towards 
such brutality is overridden by peer pressure from immediate 
comrades and superiors, and reinforced by inflammatory rhetoric of 
national leaders. The perversity can reach a point where, far from 
being considered wrongful, violence against “the other” is considered 
a righteous deed. Thus, an educational or didactic function as an 
objective of sentencing is particularly significant in the context of 
international law.109 Moreover, it approaches the notion of deterrence 
from a positive perspective of crime prevention. In addition to 
building awareness of international law, international sentencing may 
also help reinforce specific values that the international community 
seeks to advance such as tolerance or the immorality and 
wrongfulness of persecution of peoples on the basis of race, religion, 
ethnicity or nationality. At this same time, it is interesting to 
contemplate the moral dilemma and paradoxes of sustaining morality 
in war. The evils that inhere in war problematize achieving a didactic 
function through legalism, as does our extant framework. We outlaw 
aggressive war, but once that rule is violated, we say killing of a 
combatant by a combatant is lawful and killing of civilians is 
                                                 
deGuzman, Choosing to Prosecute, supra note 16; Sloane, The Expressive Capacity of 
International Punishment, supra note 40, at 70-71. 
108 See Akhavan, Beyond Impunity, supra note 68, at 7, 10, 12. 
109 See Tom J. Farer, Restraining the Barbarians: Can International Criminal 
Law Help?, 22 HUM. RTS. Q. 90, 91-92 (2000); Jelena Pejic, Creating a Permanent 
International Criminal Court: The Obstacles to Independence and Effectiveness, 29 COLUM. 
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 291, 292 (1998).  
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unlawful. It is a position that is morally problematic, a legal fiction 
that struggles to survive the realities of war. 
Some international judges, notably Judge Wolfgang 
Schomburg, have advanced the didactic function of international 
sentencing for atrocity crimes.110 In sentencing a perpetrator to 
twenty-three years of imprisonment for persecution as a crime against 
humanity, Judge Schomburg opined that punishment by an 
international criminal court “is intended to convey the message that 
globally accepted laws and rules have to be obeyed by everybody.”111 
He further added: “this fundamental rule fosters the internalisation of 
these laws and rules in the minds of legislators and the general 
public.”112 According to this ideology, “influenc[ing] the legal 
awareness of the accused, the surviving victims, their relatives, the 
witnesses and the general public” and “reassur[ing] them that the 
legal system is implemented and enforced” is one of the main 
purposes of international punishment.113 Criminologists and criminal 
law scholars have likewise embraced the “general affirmative 
prevention” function of international criminal prosecutions.114 
While international criminal prosecutions can contribute to 
this educational or didactic aim, it is unclear how this rationale can 
serve a differential principle to guide sentencing allocations. Even 
international judges who embrace didactic aims accept this limitation 
                                                 
110 See Prosecutor v. Nikolić, Trial Sentencing Judgment, supra note 58, 
paras. 139-40; Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Trial Judgment, para. 
902, (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 31, 2003), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/stakic/tjug/en/stak-tj030731e.pdf; Prosecutor v. 
Deronjić, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 52, at para. 149. 
111 Prosecutor v. Nikolić, Trial Sentencing Judgment, supra note 58, at 
para. 139. 
112 Prosecutor v. Nikolić, Trial Sentencing Judgment, supra note 58, at 
para. 139. Other trial chambers have also followed this approach. See, e.g., 
Prosecutor v. Deronjić, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 52, at para. 149. 
113 Prosecutor v. Nikolić, Trial Sentencing Judgment, supra note 58, at 
para. 139.  
114 Akhavan, Beyond Impunity, supra note 68, at 7; Damaska, What is the 
Point, supra note 40, at 334-35, 339, 345; Nemitz, The Law of Sentencing in International 
Criminal Law, supra note 25.  
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of the didactic function.115 Expressivism thus becomes a potential 
consequence of international punishment for atrocity crimes, but not 
a factor for allocating sentence severity. The ICTY’s leading 
proponent of the expressive potential of ICL, Judge Schomburg, 
prioritized retributivism over expressivism for the purposes of 
sentencing.116 Expressivism operates under the umbrella of 
retributivism. In fact, absent a firm grounding in retributive 
justification, the expressive function loses its meaning and moral 
force. The “culture of inverse morality”117accompanying atrocity 
crimes does not take root for lack of awareness of the wrongfulness 
of the conduct. Rather, the absence of accountability and punishment 
in the face of pressures and orders from fellow soldiers and superiors 
sufficiently weakens the individual’s moral resistance and motivation. 
F. Judicial Schizophrenia? Between Punitive and Restorative 
Approaches 
As reconciliation ideology gained traction in the 
jurisprudence, it challenged the tribunal’s rhetoric that retribution and 
deterrence are the primary goals of sentencing for atrocity crimes.118 
The jurisprudence, however, is unsettled as to which ideology is the 
primary rationale in international punishment and which ones are 
secondary. Consequently, inconsistency, indeterminacy, and 
confusion persist from case to case when attributing priority and thus 
                                                 
115 Prosecutor v. Nikolić, Trial Sentencing Judgment, supra note 58, at 
para. 123 (ruling that “the individual guilt of an accused limits the range of the 
sentence”). 
116 Id. 
117 Akhavan, Beyond Impunity, supra note 68, at 10. 
118 Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-A, Appeal Judgment, para. 
402 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 22, 2006), 
http://icty.org/x/cases/stakic/acjug/en/sta-aj060322e.pdf; Prosecutor v. Delalić, 
Case No. IT-96-21-A, Appeals Judgment, para. 806 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Feb. 20, 2001), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/mucic/acjug/en/cel-aj010220.pdf; Prosecutor v. 
Aleksovski, Case No. IT-94-14/1-A, Appellate Judgment, para. 185 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Mar. 24, 2000), 
http://icty.org/x/cases/aleksovski/acjug/en/ale-asj000324e.pdf; Prosecutor v. 
Milutinović, Case No. IT-05-87-T, Trial Judgment Vol. 3, paras. 1144-45 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 26, 2009), 
http://icty.org/x/cases/milutinovic/tjug/en/jud090226-e3of4.pdf.  
 2014 Dana 3:1 
63 
the influence of these rationales in sentencing allocations.119 This 
results not only in the appearance of unfair sentences but also in 
arbitrary advancement of sentencing rationales. Thoughtful scholars, 
like Professor Mark Drumbl, Jan Nemitz, and Professor Mirjan 
Damaska, have observed that under-theorization and lack of clarity 
among international judges regarding the purpose of international 
criminal prosecutions has undermined the court’s integrity and 
credibility.120 Nemitz criticizes international judges for engaging in “ex 
post facto justification” designed to legitimize a pre-determined end.121 
His “ex post facto” criticism merits further consideration, especially 
regarding the advancement of reconciliation as both a grounds for 
justifying the practice of plea-bargaining and as a mitigating factor.122 
Likewise, Drumbl argues that the ad hoc tribunals “vacillate” 
between retribution and deterrence, that is, between deontological 
and consequentialist approaches to punishment.123 Closer 
examination of the jurisprudence of the tribunals, however, 
challenges this finding. In fact, both tribunals have been remarkably 
consistent in proffering deterrence and retribution as the primary 
aims of international punishment.124 International judges do not 
                                                 
119 ANDREW ASHWORTH & ANDREW VON HIRSCH, PRINCIPLED 
SENTENCING: READINGS ON THEORY AND POLICY 167 (Andrew Ashworth et al. 
eds., 3d ed. 2009) (arguing that identifying a priority among sentencing rationales is 
essential to achieving consistency and justice). 
120 See Damaska, What is the Point, supra note 40, at 330 (arguing that 
“current views on the objectives international criminal courts are in disarray”); 
Drumbl, Collective Violence, supra note 29, at 593; Nemitz, The Law of Sentencing in 
International Criminal Law, supra note 25. 
121 Nemitz, The Law of Sentencing in International Criminal Law, supra note 
25. 
122 See infra note 133. 
123 Drumbl, Collective Violence, supra note 29, at 560-61. 
124 See Prosecutor v. Popović, Case No. IT-05-88-T, Trial Judgment, para. 
2128 (Int’l. Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jun. 10, 2010), 
http://icty.org/x/cases/popovic/tjug/en/100610judgement.pdf; Prosecutor v. 
Lukić, Case No. IT-05-87, Trial Judgment Vol. 3, paras. 1141, 1145-46 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 20, 2009), 
http://icty.org/x/cases/milutinovic/tjug/en/jud090226-e3of4.pdf; Prosecutor v. 
Milutinović, Case No. IT-05-87-T, Trial Judgment Vol.3, para. 1144 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 26, 2009), 
http://icty.org/x/cases/milutinovic/tjug/en/jud090226-e3of4.pdf; Prosecutor v. 
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appear to vacillate between retribution and deterrence ideologies. 
They do, however, vacillate between retribution and deterrence 
together on the one hand, and reconciliation on the other. Thus, I 
build on Drumbl’s theory and push the discussion forward by 
                                                 
Delić, Case No. IT-04-83-T, Trial Judgment, para. 559 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Sept. 15, 2008),  
http://icty.org/x/cases/delic/tjug/en/080915.pdf; Prosecutor v. Milošević, Case 
No. IT-98-29/1-T, Trial Judgment, para. 987 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Dec.12, 2007),  
http://icty.org/x/cases/dragomir_milosevic/tjug/en/071212.pdf; Prosecutor v. 
Martić, Case No. IT-95-11-T, Trial Judgment, para. 484 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia June 12, 2007), 
http://icty.org/x/cases/martic/tjug/en/070612.pdf; Prosecutor v. Zelenović, Case 
No. IT-96-23/2-S, Sentencing Judgment, para. 31 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Apr. 4, 2007), http://icty.org/x/cases/zelenovic/tjug/en/zel-sj070404-
e.pdf; Prosecutor v. Krajišnik, Case No. IT-00-39-T, Trial Judgment, para. 1134 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 27, 2006), 
http://icty.org/x/cases/krajisnik/tjug/en/kra-jud060927e.pdf; Prosecutor v. Orić, 
Case No. IT-03-68-T, Trial Judgment, para. 718 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia June 30, 2006), http://icty.org/x/cases/oric/tjug/en/ori-
jud060630e.pdf; Prosecutor v. Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Trial Judgment, para. 
723 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 30, 2005), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/limaj/tjug/en/lim-tj051130-e.pdf; Prosecutor v. 
Strugar, Case Trial Judgment, supra note 104, at para. 458; Prosecutor v. Blagojević, 
Case No. IT-02-60-T, Trial Judgment, para. 817 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Jan. 17, 2005), http://icty.org/x/cases/blagojevic_jokic/tjug/en/bla-
050117e.pdf; Prosecutor v. Deronjić, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 52, at paras. 
142-50; Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Trial Judgment, paras. 900-02 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 31, 2003), 
http://icty.org/x/cases/stakic/tjug/en/stak-tj030731e.pdf; Prosecutor v. Kunarac, 
Case No. IT-96-23 & IT 96-23/1-A, Trial Judgment, para. 838 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 22, 2001), 
http://icty.org/x/cases/kunarac/tjug/en/kun-tj010222e.pdf; Prosecutor v. 
Delalić, Case No. IT-96-21-A, Appellate Judgment, para. 806 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 20, 2001), 
http://icty.org/x/cases/mucic/acjug/en/cel-aj010220.pdf; Prosecutor v. 
Aleksovski, Appellate Judgment, supra note 118, at para. 185; Prosecutor v. Blaškić, 
Case No. IT-95-14-T, Trial Judgment, para. 762 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Mar. 3, 2000), http://icty.org/x/cases/blaskic/tjug/en/bla-
tj000303e.pdf; Prosecutor v. Kupreškić, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Trial Judgment, 
para. 848 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 14, 2000), 
http://icty.org/x/cases/kupreskic/tjug/en/kup-tj000114e.pdf; Prosecutor v. 
Erdemović, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 43, at paras. 58, 64; Prosecutor v. 
Tadić, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 35, at paras. 7-9. 
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focusing on vacillation between reconciliation on the one hand and 
the two joint factors of retribution and deterrence on the other hand. 
In other words, the tension is between restorative and 
punitive approaches. A number of factors have led me to prefer this 
explanation. First, almost every sentencing judgment of the ad hoc 
tribunals identifies both retribution and deterrence as the main 
rationales of international sentencing.125 Thus, to argue that 
international judges vacillate between retribution and deterrence 
requires us to focus on one or two outlier judgments and ignore the 
bulk of the jurisprudence. The argument is advanced by creating 
three markers on a vacillation continuum: (1) judgments that treat 
retribution and general deterrence equally, (2) others that cite 
retribution as the “primary objective”, and (3) a third group that 
considers “deterrence as probably the most important.”126 
The problem is that these markers do not carry the same 
weight or significance. When one plots all the cases on a continuum, 
the overwhelming majority of cases fall into group one. Only a few 
cases fall in groups two or three. Drumbl’s research confirms this.127 
For example, only one case (the Čelebići Trial Judgment) can be found 
to hold the space of the third marker, making it in my opinion more 
of an exception rather than a true vacillation. Additionally, the Čelebići 
Trial Chamber doesn’t even fully commit itself: it states “deterrence 
probably is the most important factor.”128 Moreover, on appeal the 
Appeal Chamber distances itself from this notion by explicitly ruling 
that deterrence should not be given undue prominence in the 
determination of a sentence and suggesting that retribution and 
                                                 
125 Prosecutor v. Simić, Case No. IT-95-9/2-S, Sentencing Judgment 
para. 33 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 17, 2002) (stating that 
“The Trial Chamber is cognisant of the jurisprudence of the Tribunal, which 
supports deterrence and retribution as the main general sentencing factors.”), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/milan_simic/tjug/en/sim-sj021017e.pdf. See also 
supra note 58. 
126 Drumbl, Collective Violence, supra note 29, at 560-62. 
127 Drumbl, Collective Violence, supra note 29, at 560 et seq. 
128 Prosecutor v. Delalić, Appeals Judgment, supra note 118, at para. 799 
(emphasis added). 
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deterrence are equal considerations.129 Thus, any value that the trial 
judgment potentially offered for the retribution-deterrence vacillation 
argument has been overruled by the Appeals Chamber. 
The majority of judgments do not explicitly prioritize 
between retribution and deterrence. Instead, they appear to treat 
them as “equally important.”130 The following has become a standard 
formulation found in these judgments (or language very similar): “the 
main purposes of sentencing for these crimes are deterrence and 
retribution.”131 Of course, whether these rationales in fact influence 
sentencing allocations is another question entirely. However, I would 
advance Drumbl’s thesis by focusing on vacillation between 
reconciliation on the one hand and the two joint factors, retribution 
and deterrence, on the other hand. This vacillation is more 
problematic for ICL because it exerts a more substantial, yet 
unpredictable, influence on the sentence. 
Furthermore, it highlights the serious and real tension 
between traditional criminal law functions (retribution and 
deterrence) and broader aspirations such as reconciliation and 
building a historical record. The vacillation argument takes new life 
when we unpack the impact of reconciliation ideology on the 
determination of a sentence. In fact, making more transparent the 
role of reconciliation in atrocity sentencing may help identify factors 
                                                 
129 Prosecutor v. Delalić, Appeals Judgment, supra note 118, at para. 801 
(citing Prosecutor v. Tadić, Appeal Sentencing Judgment, supra note 62, at para. 48 
(holding that deterrence “must not be accorded undue prominence in the overall 
assessment of the sentences to be imposed on persons convicted by the 
International Tribunal”). See also Prosecutor v. Alekovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-A, 
Appeals Judgment, para. 185. (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 24, 
2000), http://icty.org/x/cases/aleksovski/acjug/en/ale-asj000324e.pdf; 
Prosecutor v. Nikolić, Case No. IT-02-60/1-S, Sentencing Judgment, para. 90 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 2, 2003), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/nikolic/tjug/en/mnik-sj031202-e.pdf. 
130 Prosecutor v. Delić, Case No. IT-04-83-T, Trial Judgment, para. 559 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sep. 15, 2008), 
http://icty.org/x/cases/delic/tjug/en/080915.pdf; Prosecutor v. Ntabakuze, Case 
No. ICTR-98-41A-A, Appeals Judgment (May 8, 2012), 
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case%5CEnglish%5CNtabakuze%5CJudgemen
t%5C120508.pdf. 
131 Prosecutor v. Delalić, Appeals Judgment, supra note 118, at para. 806. 
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that contribute to seemingly incoherent sentences in international 
criminal law. Granted, establishing this link is immensely more 
challenging as reconciliation ideology is more influential in sentencing 
judgments following plea bargains, thus introducing a whole set of 
additional factors that complicate the sentencing matrix. 
Nevertheless, as elaborated more fully below, the introduction of 
reconciliation ideology into the determination of a sentence has 
considerably increased indeterminacy and confusion in international 
penology. 
Before moving on to Part II, which focuses on deterrence 
and reconciliation, I acknowledge that there are many other factors 
that have been proffered as aspirations of international 
prosecutions.132 As noted above, these include restoring peace,133 
preserving a historical record of the atrocities to prevent 
revisionism,134 ending impunity, protecting the rights of the accused 
with exemplary standards for fair trials,135 halting active armed 
                                                 
132 See, supra text accompanying note 25. See also Zoe Pearson, Non-
governmental Organizations and the International Criminal Court: Changing Landscapes of 
International Law, 39 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 243, 271-81 (2006). See generally Vojin 
Dimitrijevic & Marko Milanovic, Human Rights before International Criminal Courts, in 
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: FROM DISSEMINATION TO APPLICATION (Jonas Grimheden 
& Rolf Ring eds., 2006), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=920807. 
133 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 827, supra note 34, at pmbl.; S.C. Res. 955, supra note 
34, at pmbl.; Pejic, Creating a Permanent International Criminal Court, supra note 109, at 
292; Teitel, The Law and Politics of Contemporary Transitional Justice, supra note 25, at 
857. 
134 Jonathan A. Bush, Nuremberg: The Modern Law of War and Its Limitations, 
93 COLUM. L. REV. 2070 (1993) (reviewing TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF 
THE NUREMBERG TRIALS: A PERSONAL MEMOIR (1992)). However, the ICTY 
seems to recognize that this function should not dominate the proceedings and is 
not first and foremost among the objectives of international criminal prosecution. 
Moreover, it likewise acknowledges that the criminal justice process is not ideally 
suited for this function. Prosecutor v. Deronjić, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 
52, at para. 135 (noting that the “Tribunal is not the final arbiter of historical facts. 
That is for historians.”). 
135 See Robinson, The Identity Crisis of International Criminal Law, supra note 
20, at 926; Pejic, Creating a Permanent International Criminal Court, supra note 109, at 
294. 
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conflict,136 providing reparations to victims,137 denouncing racist 
ideologies, disarming urges for revenge,138 establishing a narrative that 
culpability is individual and not collective,139 and vindicating 
international law.140 Many have been explicitly accepted by 
international judges as part of the mandate of international criminal 
tribunals.141 This overburdening of ICL has complicated the task of 
international judges. It is beyond the scope of this article to address 
all of these aspirations, given that many of the above objectives are 
better understood as aims of trial proceedings rather than principles 
for the purpose of sentencing allocations. Therefore, the following 
sections address deterrence and reconciliation because they appear 
frequently in the sentencing judgments. 
II.  PROBLEMATIC ENTANGLEMENT WITH DETERRENCE AND 
RECONCILIATION 
A common criticism of ICL sentencing is that the proffered 
rationales for punishment are ill suited to atrocity crimes and that 
                                                 
136 See S.C. Res. 827, supra note 34, at pmbl; S.C. Res. 955, supra note 34, 
at pmbl.; Ruti Teitel, Symposium: Milosevic & Hussein on Trial: Perspective on 
Transnational Justice: Collective Memory, Command Responsibility, and the Political Psychology 
of Leadership: The Law and Politics of Contemporary Transitional Justice, 38 CORNELL 
INT’L L.J. 837, 857 (2005). 
137 See Farer, Restraining the Barbarians, supra note 109, at 91; Pejic, Creating 
a Permanent International Criminal Court, supra note 109, at 292. 
138 See Farer, Restraining the Barbarians, supra note 109, at 91. 
139 See S.C. Res. 955, supra note 34, at para. 1; Pejic, Creating a Permanent 
International Criminal Court, supra note 109, at 292; Teitel, The Law and Politics of 
Contemporary Transitional Justice, supra note 25, at 857. 
140 See S.C. Res. 827, supra note 34,at pmbl.; S.C. Res. 955, supra note 34, 
at pmbl. See also Farer, Restraining the Barbarians, supra note 109, at 91; Pejic, Creating 
a Permanent International Criminal Court, supra note 109, at 292.  
141 See Prosecutor v. Obrenovic, Case No. IT-02-60/2-S, Sentencing 
Judgment , para. 111 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 2003), 
http://icty.org/x/cases/obrenovic/tjug/en/obr-sj031210e.pdf (finding that 
“restoring peace,” “establishing a historical record,” “countering denials,” and 
providing victims with “some form of closure” are part of the mandate of 
international criminal tribunals); Prosecutor v. Nikolić, Trial Sentencing Judgment, 
supra note 58, at para. 233 (Tribunal has the task to contribute to the “restoration 
and maintenance of peace” and to ensure that serious violations of international 
humanitarian law are “halted and effectively redressed”). 
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they do not in fact guide sentencing allocations at international 
criminal courts. Per the statutes of their respective courts, 
international criminal law judges, who come from diverse countries, 
cultures, and legal systems, enjoy wide discretion in sentencing. This 
is also true for the International Criminal Court.142 Compared to its 
predecessors, the ICC statute is more detailed, more rigid, and more 
procedural in nearly every aspect of the court’s functioning,143 except 
sentencing.144 The wide discretion in sentencing matters afforded to 
judges at the ad hoc Tribunals failed to produce a unified articulated 
vision on punishment in the context of international criminal justice. 
The ICC might well draw important lessons in this regard. ICTY and 
ICTR judges have been accused of first sticking their arrow in the 
wall and then subsequently painting a bulls-eye target around it. In 
other words, international judges have a predetermined penalty in 
mind and simply mine among the rationales available to them under 
their wide discretion until they find one most convenient to their 
intended end. Although this may occur in some cases, it does not 
fully explain the sentencing practice. In the following sections, 
however, I will seek to offer a more comprehensive explanation. 
A. Deterrence 
The effectiveness of deterrence through punishment has been 
well debated at the national level. Many are skeptical of this function 
of punishment in the domestic context and have repeated their 
skepticism in the context of international criminal justice.145 Professor 
Tom Farer has noted that “[b]elief about the potential efficacy of 
penal sanctions as vehicles for enforcing international law is a fairly 
                                                 
142 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 77 (b)(1), July 
17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 38544. 
143 Judge Philippe Kirsch, The International Criminal Court: From Rome to 
Kampala, 43 J. MARSHALL L. Rev. 515, 519 (2010). 
144 Shahram Dana, Law, Justice & Politics: A Reckoning of the International 
Criminal Court, 43 J. MARSHALL L. REV. xxiii, xxvi-xxvii (2010). See Dana, Beyond 
Retroactivity, supra note 31, at 905-08.  
145 See, e.g., Jan Klabbers, Just Revenge? The Deterrence Argument in 
International Criminal Law, 12 FIN. Y.B. INT’L L., 249-67 (2001) (disagreeing that 
human rights violators can be deterred); Drumbl, Collective Violence, supra note 29, at 
609-10 (2005) (claiming that there is little or no evidence that punishment deters 
perpetrators of mass atrocities). 
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straightforward extrapolation from the collective appreciation of law 
enforcement at the national level.”146 He cautions, however, that 
“[c]onfidence in this extrapolation is not universally shared.”147 Any 
fair observer would have to concede that it is too early to judge 
whether international criminal justice can have an effective deterrent 
quality.148 If we consider Farer’s reminder that “[o]ne widely accepted 
dictum of domestic law enforcement is that a high probability of 
punishment generally deters more effectively than a very severe 
sanction rarely applied,” then the establishment of a permanent 
international criminal court can contribute to increasing the 
probability that instigators and prime movers of mass atrocities will 
be punished. International criminal law has long lacked the necessary 
enforcement mechanisms to give relative certainty to punishment for 
violations of human rights and international humanitarian law.149 
Moreover, with the current international criminal justice system 
remaining dreadfully dependent on voluntary cooperation of states, 
questions still remain whether the international system, in its present 
state, can sustain a credible threat of certain punishment so as to 
deter potential violators. Full treatment of these questions is beyond 
the scope of this article, but we may begin the discussion by focusing 
on a narrower question: to what extent does the objective of 
deterrence actually influence sentencing considerations of 
international judges? The aim here is not simply to consider the 
rhetoric employed by international judges in their discussion of the 
sentence, but to go beyond the rhetoric and examine the practice 
itself. 
All trial chambers without exception state that deterrence is 
one of the primary objectives in international sentencing.150 Several of 
                                                 
146 Farer, Restraining the Barbarians, supra note 109, at 92. 
147 Id. 
148 Drumbl, Collective Violence, supra note 29, at 608 (noting that 
international criminal law “is still relatively young” and “in a nascent stage”). 
149 See William W. Burke-White, A Community of Courts: Toward a System of 
International Criminal Law Enforcement, 24 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1, 3 (2002). 
150 For rulings by the ICTY Appeals Chamber see, for example, 
Prosecutor v. Delalić, Appeals Judgment, supra note 118, at para. 806 (“[T]he 
Appeals Chamber (and Trial Chambers of both the Tribunal and the ICTR) have 
consistently pointed out that two of the main purposes of sentencing for these 
crimes are deterrence and retribution.” (internal citations omitted)). For ICTY trial 
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the early sentencing judgments even considered deterrence to be “the 
most important factor” in determining a sentence for international 
crimes.151 Sending a strong message that the international community 
will not tolerate the perpetration of international crimes by political 
leaders and senior military officials has been considered as part of the 
Tribunals’ mandates from the very start. Particular importance was 
attached to effectively deterring the so-called “masterminds” and 
“architects” of genocidal policies and crimes against humanity. 
However, deterrence is sometimes proffered as more than an 
objective of international sentencing. According to some ICTY 
judges, it is also the justification for punishment in international 
justice. As a justification, it operates as the prime determinant of the 
appropriate length of punishment. Thus, it is a factor that influences 
the trial chambers’ determination of the length of the sentence. 
Whether the goal of deterrence meaningfully influences ICTY 
sentences can be challenged; nevertheless the sentencing judgments 
ostensibly claim sentencing allocations to be deterrence orientated. 
For example, in the Dragan Nikolić case, the Trial Chamber held that 
deterrence was among the “[f]undamental principles taken into 
consideration when imposing a sentence”.152 Thus, the objective of 
deterrence was a factor that influenced the length of Dragan Nikolić’s 
                                                 
chambers, see, for example, Prosecutor v. Deronjić, Sentencing Judgment, supra 
note 52, at para. 142 (concluding that the “[f]undamental principles taken into 
consideration when imposing a sentence are deterrence and retribution”). For cases 
from the ICTR, see Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-T, Judgment 
and Sentence (Dec. 6, 1999), 
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/Rutaganda/judgement/991206.p
df and Prosecutor v. Serushago, Case No. ICTR-98-39-S, Sentence (Feb. 5, 1999), 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/ICTR/SERUSHAGO_ICTR-98-
39/SERUSHAGO_ICTR-98-39-S.htm. 
151 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Delalić, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Trial Judgment, 
para. 1234 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 1998), 
http://icty.org/x/cases/mucic/tjug/en/981116_judg_en.pdf (stating that 
“[d]eterrence is probably the most important factor in the assessment of 
appropriate sentences for violations of international humanitarian law.”); 
Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgment, para. 761 (Int’l Crim. Trib. 
for Former Yugoslavia Mar. 3, 2000), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/blaskic/tjug/en/bla-tj000303e.pdf. 
152 Prosecutor v. Nikolic, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 94, at para. 
132 (emphasis added). 
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sentence. This was not the first time that an “objectives orientation” 
towards sentencing was adopted by an ICTY trial chamber to fix a 
sentence.153 Both the Blaškić case and the Todorović case express the 
view that the goal of deterrence may legitimately influence the 
sentence. In fact, the sentencing jurisprudence of international 
tribunals generally recognizes the “importance of deterrence as a 
consideration in sentencing for international crimes.”154 The Todorović 
Trial Chamber understood this to mean that the goal of deterrence is 
relevant to determining whether an individual’s punishment should 
be in the high or low end of the penalty range.155 Punishment 
“imposed by the International Tribunal must, in general, have 
sufficient deterrent value to ensure that those who would consider 
committing similar crimes will be dissuaded from doing so.156 The 
Blaškić Trial Chamber likewise adopts an objectives-orientated 
approach, namely general deterrence, to sentencing. But do these trial 
chambers in fact follow it? In other words, do the results (i.e. the 
sentence impose) resonate with deterrence philosophy? What, if any, 
impact did deterrence have on the sentence of Todorović and 
Blaškić? 
Todorović’s crimes included murder, sexual assaults, beatings, 
ordering and participating in the unlawful detention and cruel and 
inhuman treatment of non-Serb civilians, ordering subordinates to 
torture a person, ordering and participating in deportation and 
forcible transfers, ordering and issuing directives violating the rights 
of non-Serb civilians to equal treatment under the law, and infringing 
on their basic rights.157 He was convicted of persecution as a crime 
against humanity. He also participated in the forcible take over of the 
non-Serb towns and villages in the municipality of Bosanski Samac.158 
Todorović was the Chief of Police in Bosanski Samac and also a 
                                                 
153 See Dana, Revisiting the Blaškić, supra note 81, at 326. 
154 Prosecutor v. Todorović, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 58, at para. 
30 (citing Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-A, Appeals Judgment, 
para. 185 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 24, 2000). 
155 Prosecutor v. Todorović, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 58, at para. 
30. 
156 Id. 
157 Id. at para. 9 
158 Id. at paras. 12, 35. 
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member of the Serb Crisis Staff.159 The Todorović Trial Chamber 
considered “his abuse of such a superior position” and the “particular 
cruelty” and “duration” of the beatings as an aggravating factor.160 As 
mitigating factors, the Trial Chamber held that Todorović’s guilty 
plea, expression of remorse, and substantial cooperation with the 
Prosecution merited reduction in the penalty.161 For his crimes, the 
Prosecution recommended a sentence of five to twelve years; the 
Trial Chamber sentenced him to ten years imprisonment. 
In comparison with penalties at the national level,162 
Todorović’s punishment is notably lenient: ten years for a murder, 
multiple lengthy and brutal beatings, and sexual assaults. Thus, while 
recalling the Appeals Chamber’s rulings that deterrence is a legitimate 
consideration when fixing a penalty, the actual sentencing imposed by 
the Todorović Trial Chamber—ten years—suggests that deterrence had 
little impact on the penalty. The Todorović Trial Chamber appears to 
concede as much: “while the Chamber recognises the importance of 
deterrence as a general consideration in sentencing, it will not treat 
deterrence as a distinct factor in determining sentence in this case.”163 
Apart from the general and indeterminate nature of this ruling, it 
raises a more serious concern. In essence, the Todorović Trial Chamber 
takes the position that it is free to ignore deterrence as a 
consideration when fixing its penalty, despite the pronouncements of 
the Appeals Chamber. Moreover, it gives no explanation for why it 
chooses to not factor deterrence rationale into its sentence in this 
case. The Trial Chamber may have a good reason for not giving 
much weight to deterrence, but this reason is not made transparent. 
The lack of transparency, in turn, can lead to criticism that the 
Tribunal’s sentencing practice is unjust and arbitrary. Such criticism 
calls into question the legitimacy of international sentencing and 
undermines its expressive value. In subsequent sections, this article 
                                                 
159 Id. at para. 60. 
160 Id. at paras. 59-62. 
161 Id. at paras. 67-95. 
162 See generally THE PUNISHMENT OF SERIOUS CRIMES: A COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS OF SENTENCING LAW AND PRACTICE (Ulrich Sieber ed., vol. 2 2004) 
(citing punishment reports of various countries). 
163 Prosecutor v. Todorović, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 58, at para. 
30. 
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advances a theory that arguably explains the Trial Chamber’s 
approach here.164 
What about the Blaškić Trial Chamber?165 If the Todorović case 
serves as an example of a trial chamber paying lip service to the 
objective of deterrence but not following that ideology in its actual 
sentencing, what example does the Blaškić case provide? General 
Blaškić was the first high-ranking figure to appear before the ICTY.166 
At the start of his trial, the Tribunal had a meager eight alleged war 
criminals in its custody. War criminals to prosecute were hard to 
come by and the dockets where empty despite the fact that the Office 
of the Prosecutor (OTP) had publically issued indictments for 
seventy-five individuals.167 Among those in custody, Blaškić was not 
only the highest-ranking defendant, but also the only one of any 
significance.168 The Trial Chamber found the accused guilty of 
persecution as a crime against humanity for ordering attacks on 
towns and villages, murder, destruction of property and institutions 
dedicated to religion or education, inhuman treatment, and forcible 
transfer of civilians.169 He was also convicted of war crimes, but the 
underlying acts overlapped almost entirely with the crimes against 
humanity charges.170 In other words, due to the different 
                                                 
164 Arguably, the circumstances of Todorović’s case necessitated 
powerful pragmatic considerations, leading to a plea agreement between the 
accused and the Prosecutor. However, the low sentence is not fully explained by 
them. After all, the Trial Chamber could have given a higher sentence (that of 12 
years) and still satisfied the terms of the plea agreement. 
165 The Trial Chamber was composed of Judge Claude Jorda (Presiding), 
Judge Almiro Rodrigues, and Judge Mohamed Shahabuddeen.  
166 GARY JONATHAN BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE 4 (2000). 
167 Id. 
168 Id.  
169 Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Trial Judgment, supra note 151, at para. 267. 
The trial lasted more than two years. The Prosecution opened the trial on 24 June 
1997 and completed its case-in-chief on July 29, 1998. Presentation of evidence by 
the Defense commenced on September 7, 1998. Following a period of recess after 
the Defense rested, the Trial Chamber heard closing arguments from July 26 to 30, 
1999. 
170 See ANNOTATED LEADING CASES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
TRIBUNALS, VOLUME IV: THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE 
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 1999-2000, 659-66. (André Klip & Göran Sluite eds., 2002), 
for further analysis of General Blaškić’s criminal responsibility. 
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jurisdictional elements of crimes against humanity and war crimes, 
the alleged criminal acts were charged as both.171 I have elsewhere 
criticized the Blaškić Trial Chamber’s analysis of modes of liability,172 
which was subsequently overturned on appeal in large part.173 
For the judges in the Blaškić case, the key to determining a 
“fair” and “just” sentence was not the gravity of the offense but the 
“objectives sought” by international prosecutions and punishment.174 
In their estimation, the main objective of international prosecutions 
is deterrence.175 The commitment of the judges to deterrence is 
asserted several times and unequivocally increased General Blaškić’s 
sentence: “The Tribunal’s mission is to put to an end serious 
violations of international humanitarian law.”176 In order to achieve 
this objective, deterrence became “the most important factor in the 
assessment of appropriate sentences for violations of international 
humanitarian law.”177 Thus, the international judges here are clearly 
adopting a consequentialist approach towards General Blaškić’s 
punishment. The result was forty-five years of imprisonment; the 
                                                 
171 See William Fenrick, A First Attempt to Adjudicate Conduct of Hostilities 
Offenses: Comments on Aspects of the ICTY Trial Decision in the Prosecutor v. Tihomir 
Blaškić, 13 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 931 (2000), for a discussion on the Trial Chamber’s 
findings on the charge of unlawful attacks and its relation to persecution as a crime 
against humanity. 
172 See Dana, Revisiting the Blaškić, supra note 81. See also Prosecutor v. 
Blaškić, Trial Judgment, supra note 151, at paras. 267-70.  
173 Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Trial Judgment, supra note 151, at para. 502. 
174 Id. at para. 761. 
175 Id. at para. 762. 
176 Id. 
177 Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Trial Judgment, supra note 151, at para. 761 
(quoting Prosecutor v. Delalić “Čelebići”, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Trial Judgment 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 1998)). Moreover, the Blaškić 
Trial Chamber considered both specific deterrence and general deterrence as 
relevant factors in allocating a punishment: “Apart from the fact that the accused 
should be sufficiently deterred by appropriate sentence from ever contemplating 
taking part in such crimes again, persons in similar situations in the future should 
similarly be deterred from resorting to such crimes.” Id. (quoting the Čelebići Trial 
Judgment at para. 1234). 
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most senior figure in the court’s custody received the highest 
punishment ever imposed by the ICTY at that time.178 
The influence of deterrence in increasing Blaškić’s 
punishment is demonstrated not only by court’s consequentialist 
philosophy and severe sentence, but it is also illustrated by its 
treatment of aggravating and mitigating factors and its 
marginalization of factors relevant to individualizing the sentence.179 
In the Trial Chamber’s own words, in light of the deterrence 
“mission of the Tribunal, it is appropriate to attribute a lesser 
significance to the specific personal circumstances.”180 From the 
perspective of the Trial Chamber’s ideology, this makes perfect sense. 
It is a logical extension of its ideology because such factors are less 
relevant to the goal of deterrence. The Blaškić Trial Chamber’s 
treatment of “personal factors” and “the rehabilitation parameter” 
only serve to underscore its deterrence ideology. The court’s own 
                                                 
178 Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-A, Judgment (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 21, 2000), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/furundzija/acjug/en/fur-aj000721e.pdf (sentenced 
to 10 years); Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Appeals Judgment, supra note 118, at para. 
191 (sentenced to 7 years); Prosecutor v. Tadić, Appeal Sentencing Judgment, supra 
note 62, at para. 76 (3) (sentenced to 20 years); Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Case No. IT-
95-10-A, Judgment, para. (7) (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 5, 
2001), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/jelisic/acjug/en/jel-aj010705.pdf (sentenced 
to 40 years); Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, Case No. IT-95-16-A, Appeal Judgment, 
paras. 439, 466 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 23, 2001), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/kupreskic/acjug/en/kup-aj011023e.pdf (Josipovic 
and Santic were sentenced to 12 and 18 years, respectively); Prosecutor v. 
Kupreskic, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgment, paras. 1, 3 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Jan. 14, 2000), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/kupreskic/tjug/en/kup-tj000114e.pdf (The Trial 
Chamber acquitted Papic. The Kupreskic brothers were sentenced to 6, 8 and 10 
years, but all three were acquitted on appeal). See Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, Case No 
IT-95-16-A, Appeal Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 23, 
2001), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/kupreskic/acjug/en/kup-aj011023e.pdf. 
179 In one way or another, the Blaškić Trial Chamber found reason to 
reject the following mitigating factors: voluntary surrender (Prosecutor v. Blaškić, 
Trial Judgment, supra note 151, at para. 776); remorse (Id. at para. 775); lack of 
direct participation in the crime (Id. at para. 768); duress (Id. at para. 769); material 
context of armed conflict, i.e. disorder ensuing from a state of armed conflict (Id. at 
para. 770); and co-operation with the Prosecutor (Id. at para. 774). 
180 Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Trial Judgment, supra note 151, at para. 765. 
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findings strongly indicate that Blaškić is well suited for rehabilitation: 
he had no prior criminal record;181 assisted victims;182 was a dutiful 
and professional soldier,183 and demonstrated “exemplary behaviour” 
throughout the entire trial.184 The Trial Chamber even went so far as 
concluding that it was “evident” that Blaškić’s “character is 
reformable.”185 In sum, the Trial Chamber stated that rehabilitation is 
a factor “to be taken into account in fixing the length of the 
sentence”186 and further found, after detailed accounting, that the 
defendant before them was reformable.187 Then, in what can only be 
described as a 180, judges abruptly decide to do just the opposite of 
the principles and finding they just laid out, declaring that these 
factors will not be taken into account and are “non-existent” for the 
purposes of fixing Blaškić’s sentencing.188 
What is objectionable, even bizarre, about the judgment 
authored by Judge Claudia Jorda (France) is not its rejection of 
rehabilitation. In fact, I agree that rehabilitation is not a relevant 
factor in fixing punishment for war criminals, although their 
punishment may have that outcome. But if you are not going to take 
rehabilitation into account when allocating sentences, then why make 
a big show of it in the first place? Why declare that rehabilitation is a 
relevant to sentencing allocation? Why engage in a lengthy discussion 
that the defendant is reformable? Given this detailed analysis, we 
would have expected the judges to provide a similarly detailed 
explanation of why it is rejecting its own analysis. Instead, in a single 
sentence, the Trial Chamber summarily concludes that factors 
indicative of Blaškić’s reformability are “non-existent when determining 
the sentence.”189 It is as though by the time the Trial Chamber 
                                                 
181 Id. at para. 780. 
182 Id. at para. 781. 
183 Id. at paras. 765, 780. 
184 Id. at paras. 765, 780. 
185 Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Trial Judgment, supra note 151, at para. 781. 
186 Id. at para. 761. 
187 Id. at para. 781. 
188 Id. at para. 782. 
189 Id. at para. 782 (emphasis added). The Trial Chamber gave two 
reasons to justify its positions here: the “serious” nature of the case and the fact 
that “many accused share these personal factors” Id. at para. 782. 
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reaches the end of its analysis, it has forgotten the principles it set up 
at the start. 
Thus, although the Trial Chamber sets-out “four 
parameters”,190 it appears only seriously interested in deterrence. 
Nevertheless, despite the criticisms that may be levied against the 
Blaškić Trial Judgment,191 it must be noted in its favor that, unlike the 
Todorović Trial Chamber, it remains faithful to its espoused ideology. 
It takes the position that sentences must reflect the object of 
Tribunal’s mandate. It identifies deterrence as the main objective, and 
it imposes a sentence commensurate with that objective. 
In sum, both the Todorović and Blaškić trial chambers overtly 
state that deterrence is one of the primary goals of international 
sentencing and as such may influence the sentence. However, the 
resulting penalty in the Todorović case suggests that the goal of 
deterrence did not have much of an impact on the sentence whereas 
it appears to have a substantial influence on the Blaškić Trial 
Chamber’s sentence. The apparent inconsistency here is only 
exacerbated by the Todorović Trial Chamber’s admission that it opted 
not to consider deterrence ideology in fixing the penalty, adding a 
degree of arbitrariness to the inconsistency. Why was Blaškić not so 
fortunate to benefit from a suspension of the penalty enhancing 
effects of deterrence ideology? I will argue that the both trial 
chambers “got it right” intuitively, even if they could have done 
better to articulate their approaches. Below I will offer a theory that 
both explains the sentencing decisions of international judges and 
also guides the application of deterrence in international criminal 
justice. Before doing so, allow me to briefly identify two challenges in 
general to realizing deterrence in international criminal prosecutions. 
  
                                                 
190 They are retribution, protection of society, rehabilitation and 
deterrence. Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Trial Judgment, supra note 151, at para. 761. 
191 For example, it has departed in both ideology and practice from the 
general sentencing jurisprudence of the ICTY and ICTR that treat “gravity” of the 
crime as the primary factor in determining a sentence. Dana, Revisiting the Blaškić, 
supra note 81, at 330-32.  
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1. Challenges to realizing deterrence 
a. Practical challenges to realizing deterrence. – As noted above, 
effectively deterring future “masterminds” and “architects” of 
atrocity crimes constitutes a primary mandate of international 
tribunals. In the early days of the ICTY, the main challenge to 
realizing this mandate was that those in custody were not the 
masterminds. They were low-level soldiers like Dražan Erdemović192 
and Duško Tadić. High-ranking political and military leaders like 
Slobodan Milošević, Radovan Karadžić, Rakto Mladić, and Biljana 
Plavšić who bear the greatest responsibility for the Yugoslavia 
atrocities, were at that time beyond the reach of the ICTY.193 Nor 
was there any prospect that these men would ever see trial and 
punishment at the ICTY. The most senior ranking accused in the 
custody of the ICTY in the early days was Tihomir Blaškić, who had 
just been made a colonel at the time of the war. Although Blaškić was 
by no means a “mastermind” of the policies that lead to the 
atrocities, nor even among the high-ranking decisions makers within 
the Bosnia Croat or Croatian power structure, he was nevertheless 
the highest-ranking person before the ICTY. If the ICTY wanted to 
send a message of deterrence through severe punishment of senior 
political and military officials, who lead the masses of people into a 
bloodbath, then the Tribunal would need to impose a severe sentence 
on Blaškić. It did so without hesitation. 
                                                 
192 Croat is First to be Convicted by Balkan War Crimes Panel, N.Y TIMES, June 
1, 1996, http://www.nytimes.com/1996/06/01/world/croat-is-first-to-be-
convicted-by-balkan-war-crimes-panel.html.  
193 Milosevic was surrendered to the Tribunal on June 28, 2001. 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC CASE INFORMATION SHEET, INT’L CRIM. TRIB. FOR THE 
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/slobodan_milosevic/cis/en/cis_milosevic_slobodan
_en.pdf. Karadzic was surrendered on July 30, 2008. RADOVAN KARADZIC CASE 
INFORMATION SHEET, INT’L CRIM. TRIB. FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/cis/en/cis_karadzic_en.pdf. Mladic was 
surrendered on May 31, 2011. RAKTO MLADIC CASE INFORMATION SHEET, INT’L 
CRIM. TRIB. FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/mladic/cis/en/cis_mladic_en.pdf. Biljana Plavšić 
voluntarily surrendered to the ICTY on January 10, 2001. BILJANA PLAVSIC CASE 
INFORMATION SHEET, INT’L CRIM. TRIB. FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/plavsic/cis/en/cis_plavsic+en/pdf. 
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  b. Theoretical challenges to realizing deterrence. – To further examine 
the role and relevance of deterrence to international sentencing at the 
individual level, it may be helpful to place perpetrators of atrocities 
crimes in two broad categories of offenders: low-level perpetrators 
and high-level perpetrators. Regarding the former, contextual 
considerations, such as a culture of inverse morality as noted by other 
authors,194 challenges the appropriateness and effectiveness of 
deterrence. Although here, the didactic function of ICL or 
“affirmative general prevention” can play a role in preventing such a 
culture from taking root.195 Deterrence, however, may be better 
suited to sentencing in relation to the latter group of high-level 
perpetrators. If we assume the model of the “rational calculating” 
criminal, then from a utilitarian perspective, punishment can have a 
deterrent effect by tipping the scales on the cost-benefit analysis196 so 
that “crime does not pay.” Naturally, more contextual and factual 
research needs to be preformed in order to firm up this 
proposition.197 But there is a sufficient basis, grounded in facts and 
the realities of the rise of such atrocities, to say that many of the 
high-level leaders, who are responsible for instigating the 
circumstance that lead to such dire calamities and cataclysms, 
deliberately and calculatedly promulgated doctrine of racial hatred or 
extreme nationalism and cynically propagated such divisive currencies 
to ascend to political power. Punishment of such persons can 
demonstrate that there is a cost, in terms of a severe penalty, for 
those that seek to gain political power through tactics that endanger 
the stability of society. The punishment must outweigh any political 
gains. 
2. Perpetrator hierarchy and deterrence 
Even if one disagrees with this approach, it may explain what 
the Tribunals are doing. As demonstrated above, some ICTY trial 
                                                 
194 See Akhavan, Beyond Impunity, supra note 68, at 7. 
195 Nemitz, The Law of Sentencing in International Criminal Law, supra note 
25, at 90, 110-11. 
196  See generally, Akhavan, Beyond Impunity, supra note 68, at 8. 
197 Jan Klabbers, Just Revenge? The Deterrence Argument in International 
Criminal Law, 12 FINNISH Y.B. INT’L L. 249, 2001 (disagreeing that human rights 
violators can be deterred). 
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chambers took a consequentialist approach towards punishment of 
human right violators, focusing on deterrence. While the rhetoric on 
deterrence is bold and broad, the practice reveals a more subtle and 
sophisticated nuance. There is some evidence that international 
judges weigh the relevance of deterrence in determining the penalty 
for a particular perpetrator based on that person’s position of 
authority. This is illustrated through the examples of the punishment 
of Blaškić and Todorović. Both trial chambers declare the objective 
of deterrence to be a factor in their sentencing approach. The Blaškić 
Trial Chamber in particular appears wholly fixated on deterrence, but 
a closer reading reveals that its myopic consequentialism is induced 
by the presence of a high-ranking perpetrator. It even declares that 
“the Tribunal was set up to punish according to the accused’s level of 
responsibility.”198 Thus, the judges in the Blaškić case approached the 
deterrence factor with regard to the Blaškić’s role and position in the 
overall hierarchy that was responsible for the atrocities. 
Moreover, regarding the influence of general deterrence on 
punishment, with a few exceptions, ICL sentencing practice indicates 
that the objective of general deterrence will increase the sentence of a 
high-ranking perpetrator, but generally has little affect on the 
sentence of rank and file soldiers, unless they demonstrated notorious 
cruelty or exceptional brutality. This explains to some extent why 
Todorović received a very low sentence. Boiler plate rhetoric aside, 
international judges do not actually seem to be very convinced that 
deterrence is relevant or effective in the case of rank and file, low 
level perpetrators. A more cynical view attributes Todorović’s low 
punishment to the embarrassing situation the ICTY found itself in 
when the United Nations sanctioned peacekeeping force, S-FOR,199 
refused to comply with the Court’s order to turn over documents 
relevant to his arrest and transfer to The Hague.200 This perspective, 
however, does not entirely account for how low the Trial Chamber 
went with Todorović’s sentence because the judges could have given 
                                                 
198 Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Trial Judgment, supra note 151, at para. 808. 
199 S-FOR stands for “Stabilization Force” which was led by NATO but 
established by United Nations Security Council pursuant to Resolution 1088 on 
December 12, 1996. 
200 Combs, Copping a Plea, supra note 95, at 118-22; See discussion infra 
Section II(B)(2). 
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a higher sentence and still remained within the scope and terms of 
the plea agreement. 
Moreover, the point can be established by other examples less 
tainted by cynicism. Consider for example the ICTR’s punishment of 
Mikaeli Muhimana, the conseiller of the Gishyita secteur.201 The Trial 
Chamber found that he “occupied a position of influence in the 
community” and that instead of using his position to protect the 
defenseless, he actively participated in the attacks against Tutsi 
civilians seeking refuge in churches and hospitals. Muhimana raped 
and killed women who he believed to be Tutsi in the most gruesome 
and brutal manner.202 In sentencing him to imprisonment for the 
remainder of his life, the Trial Chamber found a host of aggravating 
factors such as his position of influence,203 the fact that the victims 
were seeking refuge,204 the young age (fifteen years old) of one of the 
rape victims,205 presence of others during the rapes,206 intentionally 
increasing the suffering of the victim,207 public humiliation,208 
savagery,209 and the fact that the victim was pregnant.210 Some of 
these aggravating factors could arguably be characterized as factors 
pertaining to the gravity of the offense. In fact, in its recent 
                                                 
201 Prosecutor v. Muhimana, Case No. ICTR-95-1B-T, Summary of 
Judgment, paras. 3, 4 (Apr. 28, 2005), 
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case%5CEnglish%5CMuhimana%5Cjudgement
%5C280405summary.pdf. 
202 Prosecutor v. Muhimana, Case No. ICTR-95-1B-T, Judgment and 
Sentence, paras. 606-15 (Apr. 28, 2005), 
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/Muhimana/decisions/muhimana
280505.pdf. (In one incident, Muhimana “used a machete to cut the pregnant 
woman Pascasie Mukaremera from her breasts down to her genitals and remove 
her baby, who cried for some time before dying. After disembowelling the woman, 
the assailants accompanying Muhimana then cut off her arms and stuck sharpened 
sticks into them.”). 
203 Prosecutor v. Muhimana, Judgment and Sentence, supra note 202, at 
para. 604. 
204 Id. at para. 605. 
205 Id. at para. 607. 
206 Id. at para. 609. 
207 Id. at para. 610.  
208 Prosecutor v. Muhimana, Judgment and Sentence, supra note 202, at 
para. 611.  
209 Id. at para. 612. 
210 Id. at para. 612.  
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sentencing judgment, the ICC treated similar factors as relevant only 
to its assessment of “gravity” and rejected them as aggravating 
factors, which was how the ICC Prosecutor characterized them.211 In 
the context of the ICTR’s sentencing provisions, which give 
international judges “unfettered discretion” in fashioning a penalty, 
the distinctive functions of “gravity of the offense” and “aggravating 
circumstances” are somewhat marginalized, so long as the trial 
chamber is careful to not consider the same factor twice. However, 
the lack of doctrinal and theoretical clarity on the intersection 
between and distinctiveness of “gravity” and “aggravating 
circumstance” will prove more problematic for the ICC because, inter 
alia, the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (RPE) require the 
existence of at least one aggravating circumstance before the court 
can impose life imprisonment.212 
Both the Prosecution and the Trial Chamber position 
Muhimana as a “conseiller” and “businessman.”213 The Trial Chamber 
found that the defendant’s status in the society where he lived 
constituted an aggravating factor.214 Generally speaking, persons in 
positions of public authority who abuse their positions and the 
powers entrusted to them to commit or advance mass atrocities merit 
greater punishment because such perpetrators are more dangerous in 
that they cast a wider net of harm and destruction. The enhanced 
punishment is also justified because they have breached a sacred trust 
by employing their position and the machineries at their disposal to 
victimize those to whom they had a duty to serve and protect. These 
factors have a direct impact on the criminality. The jurisprudence of 
the ICTY and ICTR recognizes these principles by holding “superior 
position,” or in some cases, “abuse of authority” as an aggravating 
factor. The ICTR Trial Chamber viewed Muhimana as a high-level 
                                                 
211 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on Sentence pursuant 
to Article 76, supra note 2, at paras. 92-9. 
212 INT’L CRIM CT. R. P. & EVID. 145 (3) (2003). 
213 Prosecutor v. Muhimana, Judgment and Sentence, supra note 202, at 
paras. 596, 604.  
214 Id. at paras. 595-96.  
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and influential person and, like the ICTY’s Blaškić Trial Chamber, 
imposed a severe punishment.215 
In Muhimana case, however, the Defense should have 
challenged the Prosecutor’s submission that his status should be an 
aggravating factor. In this case, it is unclear how his “status” 
aggravated his criminality. The Prosecution does not argue that 
Muhimana held any political position or that his “status” lead to an 
abuse of authority. The Prosecution only submits that “his close 
associations with senior civil servants and prominent business people, 
and his popularity . . . further enhanced his ‘status’.”216 The Trial 
Chamber accepted this argument and aggravating his penalty because 
of his “status.”217 However, while his associations and popularity may 
have enhanced his “status,” the Trial Chamber does not explain how 
it enhances his culpability in relation to his crimes. The Muhimana 
Trial Chamber found no mitigating circumstances,218 and the Defense 
surprising made no submissions on this point.219 
In sum, international judges at the ad hoc Tribunals boldly 
proclaim the deterrent function of international criminal 
prosecutions.220 They demonstrate confidence in the deterrent 
capacity of international courts, and state that the goal of deterrence 
influences their determination of penalties.221 This obtuse rhetoric 
                                                 
215 Id. at para. 618.  
216 Id. at para. 596. 
217 Id. at para. 604. 
218 Prosecutor v. Muhimana, Judgment and Sentence, supra note 202, at 
para. 616. 
219 Id. at para. 602. 
220 See Prosecutor v. Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-A, Judgment, para. 441 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 30, 2006), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/galic/acjug/en/gal-acjud061130.pdf. See also 
Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgment, paras. 891, 900, 902 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 31, 2003), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/stakic/tjug/en/stak-tj030731e.pdf. 
221 See Prosecutor v. Plavšić, Sentencing Judgement, supra note 36, at 
para. 24; Prosecutor v. Krajišnik, Case No. IT-00-39-A, Judgment, paras. 775-77 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 17, 2009), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/krajisnik/acjug/en/090317.pdf. See also Prosecutor v. 
Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgment, paras. 900-02 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia July 31, 2003), 
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obfuscates the actual sentencing practice, which demonstrates greater 
nuance. The general sentencing jurisprudence reveals that the goal of 
deterrence has little impact on increasing the penalty of low-level war 
criminals. Deterrence plays a more significant role in enhancing the 
penalty for a high-level perpetrator or those that had significant 
power or influence. This unspoken distinction mirrors the position of 
some observers that rank and file common persons cannot be easily 
deterred when surrounded by the chaos of systematic criminality 
during war.222 Instead, the goal of deterrence should focus ICL’s 
                                                 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/stakic/tjug/en/stak-tj030731e.pdf; Prosecutor v. 
Blaškić, Judgment, supra note 151, at para. 761; Prosecutor v. Delić, Case No. 1T-
04-83-T, Trial Judgment, para. 559 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 
Sept 15, 2008), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/delic/tjug/en/080915.pdf; 
Prosecutor v. Milutinović, Case No. IT-05-87-T, Judgment, para. 1144 ( Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 26, 2009), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/milutinovic/tjug/en/jud090226-e3of4.pdf; 
Prosecutor v. Lukić, Case No. IT-98-32/1-T, Trial Judgment, para. 1049 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 20, 2009), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/milan_lukic_sredoje_lukic/tjug/en/090720_j.pdf; 
Prosecutor v. Popović, Case No. IT-05-88-T, Trial Judgment, para. 2128 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 10, 2010), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/popovic/tjug/en/100610judgement.pdf; Prosecutor 
v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, Trial Judgment, para. 838 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 22, 2001), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/kunarac/tjug/en/kun-tj010222e.pdf; Prosecutor v. 
Blagojević, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Trial Judgment, para. 817 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 17, 2005), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/blagojevic_jokic/tjug/en/bla-050117e.pdf; 
Prosecutor v. Strugar, Trial Judgment, supra note 104, at para. 458; Prosecutor v. 
Limaj, Case No. 1T-03-66-T, Trial Judgment, para. 723 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia November. 30, 2005), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/limaj/tjug/en/lim-tj051130-e.pdf; Prosecutor v. 
Orić, Case No. 1T-03-68-T, Trial Judgment, para. 718 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia June 30, 2006), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/oric/tjug/en/ori-
jud060630e.pdf; Prosecutor v. Tadić, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 35,at paras. 
7-9; Prosecutor v Kupreški, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Trial Judgment, para. 848 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 14, 2000), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/kupreskic/tjug/en/kup-tj000114e.pdf. 
222 However, this is by no means universal. In the both the Yugoslav and 
Rwandan atrocities, there are a number of examples of great human moral courage 
resisting the systematic criminality. See Bernard Muna, The ICTR Must Achieve Justice 
for Rwandans, 13 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1481 (1998). 
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punitive sting for leaders who used their power and influence to 
execute criminal policies. 
B. Reconciliation 
One unresolved question regarding the primary role of 
international criminal justice mechanisms is to what extent the ICC 
should allow reconciliation ideology to influence its decision-making. 
Prioritizing reconciliation (a restorative focus) over retribution and 
deterrence (punitive focuses) may alter decisions by the ICC 
Prosecutor at the front end, for example in case and situation 
selection, as well as decisions by judges at the back end, for example 
when sentencing. The experience of the ICTY shows that the 
absence of a coherent theoretical underpinning for the application of 
reconciliation ideology has lead to some troubling results. To 
illustrate this we may consider the following cases: Erdemovic,223 
Jelišić,224 Sikirica,225 Plavšić,226 Bralo,227 and Nikolić.228 
Since 2001, the practice of plea-bargaining increased 
exponentially in international prosecutions.229 At the same time, 
                                                 
223 Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 43; 
Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Appeals Judgment (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 7, 1997), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/erdemovic/acjug/en/erd-aj971007e.pdf. 
224  Prosecutor v. Jelišić, Case No. IT-95-10-T, Judgment (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 14, 1999), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/jelisic/tjug/en/jel-tj991214e.pdf; Prosecutor v. 
Jelišić, Case No. IT-95-10-A, Appeals Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia July 5, 2001), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/jelisic/acjug/en/jel-
aj010705.pdf. 
225 Prosecutor v. Sikirica, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 84. 
226 Prosecutor v. Plavsic, Case No. IT-00-39&40/1-S, Sentencing 
Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 27, 2003), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/plavsic/tjug/en/pla-tj030227e.pdf. 
227 Prosecutor v. Bralo, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 94; Prosecutor 
v. Bralo, Judgment on Sentencing Appeal, supra note 94. 
228 Prosecutor v. Nikolic, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 94; Prosecutor 
v. Nikolic, Case No. IT-94-2, Judgement on Sentencing Appeal, (Int’l Crim. Trib. 
for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 4, 2005), 
http://icty.org/x/cases/dragan_nikolic/acjug/en/nik-jsa050204e.pdf. 
229 See COMBS, GUILTY PLEAS, supra note 37. 
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reconciliation ideology gained traction among international judges.230 
To appreciate this phenomenon, it is necessary to start with the early 
practice at the Tribunal in relation to both plea-bargaining and 
reconciliation. As a preliminary matter, it should be noted that guilty 
pleas at international tribunals come in two varieties: “unilateral” 
guilty pleas and bargained-for guilty pleas. The latter consists of 
situations where the defense engages in negotiations with the 
Prosecutor for the defendant’s admission to the certain charges in 
exchange for the Prosecutor’s agreement to dismiss other charges 
and/or allegations from the indictment (charge reduction), and/or to 
recommend a lenient sentence, or to refrain from seeking a particular 
(high) penalty (sentence reduction). It excludes situations where the 
accused accepts his or her criminal responsibility and enters a guilty 
plea without negotiating for charge or sentence reduction. In these 
guilty pleas, no bargaining or negotiating is needed to secure the 
defendant’s admission. In other words, not all guilty pleas are the 
result of plea-bargaining.231 
1. Early practice: reconciliation ideology has no influence on sentencing.  
In the first ten years of the ICTY’s operations, only two cases 
were disposed of by plea bargaining: the Todorović case and the Sikirica 
case.232 Each contained some element out of the ordinary. A third 
                                                 
230 Prosecutor v. Obrenović, Case No. IT-02-60/2-S, Sentencing 
Judgment, para. 111 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 2003), 
http://icty.org/x/cases/obrenovic/tjug/en/obr-sj031210e.pdf; Prosecutor v. 
Nikolić, Trial Sentencing Judgment, supra note 58, at para. 233; Prosectuor v. Mrða, 
Case No. IT-02-59-S, Sentencing Judgment, para. 78 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Mar. 31, 2004), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/mrda/tjug/en/sj-
040331.pdf; Prosecutor v. Jokic, Case No. IT-01-42/1-S, Sentencing Judgment, 
para. 76 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 18, 2004), 
http://icty.org/x/cases/miodrag_jokic/tjug/en/jok-sj040318e.pdf; Prosecutor v. 
Rajic, Case No. IT-95-12-S, Sentencing Judgment, para. 146 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
the Former Yugoslavia May 8, 2006), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/rajic/tjug/en/raj-tj0060508e.pdf. 
231 An illustrative example is the case of Dražan Erdemović and his 
immediate plea of guilt at his initial appearance. See Erdemović, Dražen, HAGUE J. 
PORTAL, http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/index.php?id=6096 (last visted Oct. 
13, 2013). See also Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 43. .  
232 Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Case No. IT-95-10-T, Judgment, para. 11 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 14, 1999), 
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case—against Goran Jelišić, a camp commander—involved the 
accused pleading guilty to all counts but one—genocide—and the 
Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) continued to trial on the remaining 
count. Thus, his plea does not appear to have been bargained for. All 
three cases underscore an OTP policy against plea-bargaining, 
especially when the accused has been charged with genocide. 
Reconciliation ideology is virtually non-existent as a sentencing factor 
in these early cases.233 
In the Jelišic case, a camp commander pled guilty to thirty-one 
individual counts of crimes against humanity and war crimes. The 
only charge that Jelišić refused to accept responsibility for was a 
single charge of genocide.234 Given that the OTP had substantial 
evidence to prove genocide, it refused to drop the charge from the 
indictment. Much to the disappointment of the judges, the 
Prosecution insisted on proceeding to trial against Jelišić for the 
single count of genocide, even though Jelišić was already facing a very 
severe prison sentence resulting from his guilty plea to very serious 
crimes, including multiple murders committed in the most chilling 
and wicked manner. The tension between the ICTY judges and the 
Prosecutor was plainly evident during the course of the trial. The 
judges were frustrated at what they considered wasteful expenditure 
of time and resources on a trial of a relatively minor figure that had 
already pled guilty to crimes against humanity and war crimes grave 
enough to merit a forty-year sentence. The OTP was equally 
determined to try Jelišić for genocide so that the record would reflect 
what it believed was the true scope of his culpability. The policy 
behind the OTP’s uncompromising stance was the idea that the 
                                                 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/jelisic/tjug/en/jel-tj991214e.pdf (pleading guilty on 
October 29,1998); Prosecutor v. Todorović, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 58, at 
para. 5 (pleading guilty on December 13, 2000); Prosecutor v. Sikirica, Sententing 
Judgment, supra note 84, at paras. 12-15 (pleading guilty on September 19, 2001; 
September 19, 2001; and September 4, 2001, respectively). As explained above, the 
Erdemović case is not included among these cases because Erdemović pled guilty 
at his initial appearance.  
233 See also Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 43. 
234 Press Release, Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, “Brcko” 
Indictment: Goran Jelisic Pleads Guilty to the Majority of the Charges in the 
Second Amended Indictment, JL/PIU/357-E (Oct. 29, 1998), 
http://www.icty.org/sid/7624. 
 2014 Dana 3:1 
89 
crime of genocide carries too much significance to be dropped simply 
because the accused has accepted responsibility for other crimes. The 
Jelišić case demonstrates the OTP’s unwillingness to provide the 
accused with any concession by way of charge or penalty reduction 
for his guilty plea. As noted above, however, it would be incorrect to 
characterize Jelišić’s guilty plea as a plea bargain. Jelišić sua sponte 
accepted responsibility for all the charges against him except the 
crime of genocide.235 No bargaining or negotiating was needed to 
secure his admission to the other crimes. 
Stevan Todorović and Biljana Plavšić, on the other hand, 
represent cases of carefully crafted plea bargains. Todorović muscled 
a highly favorable plea deal out of the Prosecutor. His Defense team 
successfully obtained an order from the ICTY directing the NATO 
led S-FOR to cooperate with the defendant by producing documents 
and making senior officials available as witnesses for his hearing 
challenging the lawfulness of his arrest, detention, and transfer to 
The Hague by S-FOR. Todorović was living comfortably in his 
hometown in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and woke up 
one morning to find himself hooded and handcuffed in a helicopter 
on his way to S-FOR’s Tuzla Air Force Base.236 One version of the 
events attributes his capture to four bounty hunters.237 According to 
Todorović, his kidnapping was a clandestine operation orchestrated 
by S-FOR in which he was hooded, beaten, kidnapped, and taken to 
the boarder of Bosnia Herzegovina to be subsequently transferred by 
S-FOR to the ICTY.238 
Claiming that his arrest was illegal and violated fundamental 
human rights, Todorović sought to compel S-FOR to hand over 
                                                 
235 Id. 
236 Press Release, Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Decision 
on Todorovic’s Motion For Judicial Assistance, XT/ P.I.S./ 636-e (Oct. 20, 2000), 
http://www.icty.org/sid/7811. 
237 See, Combs, Copping a Plea, supra note 95, at 118. 
238 Combs, Copping a Plea, supra note 95, at 118-19. See also Susan Lamb, 
Illegal Arrest and the Jurisdiction of the ICTY, in ESSAYS ON ICTY PROCEDURE 
AND EVIDENCE IN HONOUR OF GABRIELLE KIRK MCDONALD 27-35 
(Richard May et al. eds., 2001) (discussing the events surrounding Todorovic’s 
arrest and transfer to the ICTY). 
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documents and witnesses to support his allegations.239 The trial 
judges ordered the North Atlantic Council, thirty-three individual 
States, and S-FOR itself to disclose specific documents. In a bold 
move, they also ordered the Commanding General of S-FOR, Eric 
Shinseki of the United States, to appear as a witness in his individual 
capacity at the hearing. All parties promptly refused to comply with 
the order, citing possible security risks to an on-going military and 
peacekeeping operation.240 The standoff was an embarrassment to the 
United Nations and the ICTY—a U.N. created peacekeeping force 
flatly refused to comply with an order of a U.N. judicial body. Would 
power submit to the law? NATO’s non-compliance with the ICTY 
order seemly contradicted the principle that all must obey the law. 
The ICTY—in fact the entire enterprise of international criminal 
justice—was predicated on the notion of accountability and that no 
one was above the law. It was a direct challenge to the authority of 
the court from an unexpected source, something ICTY defendants 
had been doing since the first time the court asserted jurisdiction.241 
With his motion threatening the legitimacy of the ICTY if 
NATO were to continue to disobey the order, Todorović gained 
leverage in his negotiations with the Prosecutor. NATO, the U.S., 
and other states appealed the decision and the Appeals Chamber 
stayed the Trial Chamber’s order pending the outcome of the appeal. 
Meanwhile, ICTY lawyers scrambled behind the scenes. While the 
appeal was pending, the OTP and the defendant filed a joint and 
confidential ex parte motion, submitting to the court a negotiated plea 
agreement.242 Todorović agreed to plea guilty to the crime of 
persecution on political, racial, and religious grounds as a crime 
                                                 
239 See Combs, Copping a Plea, supra note 95, at 119. 
240 Combs, Copping a Plea, supra note 95, at 119. 
241 Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on the Defense 
Motion on Jurisdiction (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Aug. 10, 1995), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/tdec/en/100895.htm. 
242 See Prosecutor v. Simic, Simic, Tadic, Todorovic, and Zaric, Case No. 
IT-95-9-PT, Judicial Supplements, Decision on (1) Application by Stevan 
Todorovic to re-open the Decision of 27 July 1999, (2) Motion by ICRC to Re-
Open Scheduling Order of 18 November 1999, and (3) Conditions for Access to 
Material (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 28, 2000), 
http://icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/jud_supplement/supp12-e/simic.htm. 
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against humanity.243 Tellingly, the plea agreement specifically required 
him to withdraw: (1) all pending motions regarding his arrest; (2) all 
factual allegations that his arrest was unlawful; and (3) all claims that 
NATO or SFOR participated in any unlawful activity in connection 
his arrest.244 To secure the deal, the OTP withdrew the remaining 
twenty-six counts and recommended a prison sentence of five to 
twelve years.245 
The Sikirica case involved three defendants: Duško Sikirica, 
Damir Došen and Dragan Kolundžija.246 All three were charged with 
crimes against humanity and violations of the laws and customs of 
war. However, Sikirica was also charged with genocide. The 
defendants all entered a plea of not guilty and the case proceeded to 
trial.247 After the close of the Prosecution’s case-in-chief, Sikirica filed 
a Rule 98bis motion to dismiss the genocide count, which was 
granted. Then, to everyone’s surprise, during the presentation of the 
defense rebuttal, one of Sikirica’s co-defendants changed his plea and 
pled guilty to crimes against humanity. With the code of silence 
broken, the remaining defendants also sought the Prosecutor for a 
plea bargain. The plea agreement between Sikirica and the OTP made 
clear that the Prosecutor would not have accepted his plea while the 
charges of genocide were still pending against him.248 This reluctance 
towards plea-bargaining is in line with the OTP’s policy in the Jelisić 
                                                 
243 Count 1 of the indictment. Prosecutor v. Todorović, Sentencing 
Judgment, supra note 58, at para. 5. 
244 Prosecutor v. Todorović, Case No. IT-95-9/1, Decision on the 
Prosecution Motion to Withdraw Counts of the Indictment and Defence Motion 
to Withdraw Pending Motions, para. 1 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 
Feb. 26, 2001),  
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/todorovic/tdec/en/10226DC515095.htm; 
Prosecutor v. Todorović, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 58, at para. 5. 
245 Prosecutor v. Todorović, Decision on the Prosecution Motion to 
Withdraw Counts of the Indictment and Defence Motion to Withdraw Pending 
Motions, supra note 244, at para. 2; Prosecutor v. Todorović, Sentencing Judgment, 
supra note 58, at para. 4. 
246 Sikirica was the most senior ranking of the three. 
247 See William Schabas, Commentary, in ANNOTATED LEADING CASES OF 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS, VOLUME VIII: THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 2001-2002 1078-82 (André 
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cases. The ICTY Prosecutor manifested complete aversion toward 
any type of bargaining or deal making that would require her to 
withdraw a genocide charge. 
While the Prosecution refused to bargain in the Jelisić case, it 
did not have to in the Erdemović case—he comprehensively and 
immediately accepted responsibility to the entire indictment against 
him. The Erdemović case challenges the ICTY’s current ideological 
narrative constructed around reconciliation. Extant sentencing 
judgments declare reconciliation as an ideology—something more 
than mere ex post facto rationalization of an expanding plea bargaining 
practice and lenient sentences, but as a principled justification for 
mitigating penalty. However, the judges do not advance such a view 
of reconciliation in the Erdemović sentencing judgment, even though 
the facts of the case offered an opportunity to establish this platform. 
Erdemović did not attempt to negotiate a deal behind the scenes. He 
plead guilty to all crimes charged at his first hearing, expressed 
genuine remorse, and fully cooperated with the Prosecution in bring 
to light what happened. Although in subsequent cases, notably the 
Plavšić case, these factors are considered relevant to determining the 
accused’s contribution to reconciliation and thus a reduction in 
punishment, the Erdemović Trial Chamber did not consider 
contribution to reconciliation per se as a sentencing factor. In fact, 
“reconciliation” is mentioned merely twice in passing in the entire 
judgment.249 It is not discussed in relation to Erdemović’s acceptance 
of guilt, nor do the international judges appear to be particularly 
interested in the possibility that his unreserved admission of 
responsibility for his share in the atrocities will foster reconciliation. 
Compare this to the twenty-seven times the ICTY judges 
discuss reconciliation in the Plavšić case and their unbridled 
enthusiasm about how her narrowly crafted and limited admission 
will have a significant impact on reconciliation in the former 
Yugoslavia. It comes as no surprise that the notion of reconciliation 
overwhelms the analysis of the sentencing judgment in the Plavšić 
                                                 
249 Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 43, at para. 
58. In comparison, in the Plavšić case, the concept of reconciliation appears no less 
than 27 times in the sentencing judgment. Prosecutor v. Plavšić, Sentencing 
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case, but is non-existent in the Erdemović case. The latter did not 
bargain his plea, made no demands for charge reduction, made no 
effort to limit the factual basis of his admission (i.e. he did not limit 
the historical record), and did not insist on first obtaining the 
Prosecution’s agreement to recommend a reduced sentence. 
Therefore, I argue that the rise of reconciliation as an ideology in 
international criminal law has less to do with the goal of 
reconciliation and more to do with rationalizing plea-bargaining. 
Reconciliation gained notoriety in cases where the accused bargained 
for a less comprehensive factual record and a reduction in charges or 
punishment.250 But this deal making in the face of grossly 
unspeakable crimes required a counterweight. Enter reconciliation. It 
is an apology for plea-bargaining atrocity crimes, an attempt to recast 
plea deals as an ally of truth and history rather than cutting the legs of 
public and accurate record building. These matters are addressed in 
greater detail in the next section. 
To summarize the background materials, the ICTY’s early 
jurisprudence and practice seems to indicate that reconciliation was 
not a central issue in sentencing and that the Prosecution was 
unwilling to bargain away the charge of genocide. The Plavšić case 
reversed the trajectory on both matters. It was the first time the 
Prosecutor willingly dropped the charges of genocide against an 
accused in return for her guilty plea. Moreover, it marked the coming 
of age of “reconciliation” as it proved an influential force in 
mitigating Biljana Plavšić’s sentence. 
2. The coming of age of reconciliation ideology 
The Plavšić case marks a turning point in the ICTY’s legacy. 
The rise of reconciliation ideology as a justification for the practice of 
plea-bargaining251 and as a mitigating factor in sentencing can trace 
their origins to this case. Prior to the Plavšić Sentencing Judgment, only 
                                                 
250 Janine Natalya Clark, Plea-Bargaining at the ICTY: Guilty Pleas and 
Reconciliation, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 415, 416 (2009) (arguing that reconciliation is 
“seriously undermined” by plea-bargaining and reduced prison sentences). 
251 See Damaska, What is the Point, supra note 40, at 341 (concluding that 
the only viable justification for plea bargaining is efficiency), for a critique of 
various justifications for plea-bargaining. 
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three cases in the ICTY’s ten-year history had been disposed of by 
plea-bargaining. In sharp contrast, following the Plavšić judgment, the 
first twelve months alone witnessed at least seven cases disposed of 
by way of plea-bargaining.252 These plea bargains occasioned 
“unseemly” lenient sentencing recommendations by the OTP.253 
Likewise, the practice of dismissing the charge of genocide can trace 
its origins to the Plavšić case. Plavšić was initially indicted for the 
                                                 
252 Prosecutor v. Simić, Case No. IT-95-9-2-S, Sentencing Judgment, 
paras. 9-16 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 17 2002), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/milan_simic/tjug/en/sim-sj021017e.pdf (pleading 
guilty on May 13, 2002); Prosecutor v. Obrenović, Case No. IT-02-60/2-S, 
Sentencing Judgment, paras. 10, 12-21 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 
May 21, 2003), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/obrenovic/tjug/en/obr-
sj031210e.pdf (pleading guilty on May 21, 2003); Prosecutor v. Momir Nikolić, 
Case No IT-02-60/1-S, Sentencing Judgment, para. 12 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Dec. 2, 2003), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/nikolic/tjug/en/mnik-sj031202-e.pdf (pleading 
guilty on May 7, 2003); Prosecutor v. Mrda, Case No. IT-02-59-S, Sentencing 
Judgment, para. 5 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 31, 2004), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/mrda/tjug/en/sj-040331.pdf (pleading guilty on July 
24, 2003); Prosecutor v. Jokić, Case No. IT-01-42/1-S, Sentencing Judgment, paras. 
7-14 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 18, 2004), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/miodrag_jokic/tjug/en/jok-sj040318e.pdf (pleading 
guilty on Aug. 27, 2003); Prosecutor v. Banović, Case No. IT-02-65-1-S, Sentencing 
Judgment, para. 13 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 28, 2003) 
(pleading guilty on June 26, 2003), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/banovic/tjug/en/ban-sj031028e.pdf; Prosecutor v. 
Dragan Nikolić, Case No. IT-94-2-S, Sentencing Judgment, paras. 5, 14 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 18, 2003), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/dragan_nikolic/tjug/en/nik-sj031218e.pdf (pleading 
guilty on Sept. 4, 2003); Prosecutor v. Češić, Case No. IT-95-10/1-S, Sentencing 
Judgment, para. 4 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 11, 2004), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/cesic/tjug/en/ces-tj040311e.pdf (pleading guilty on 
Oct. 8, 2003); Prosecutor v. Deronjić, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 52, at paras. 
18-19 (pleading guilty on Sept. 30, 2003); Prosecutor v. Babić, Case No. IT-03-72-
S, Sentencing Judgment, para. 10 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 
29, 2004), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/babic/tjug/en/bab-sj040629e.pdf 
(pleading guilty on Jan. 27, 2004); Miroslav Bralo, Case No. IT-95-17-S, Sentencing 
Judgment, para. 3 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 7, 2005), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/bralo/tjug/en/bra-sj051207-e.pdf (pleading guilty on 
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253 See Nancy Amoury Combs, Procuring Guilty Pleas for International Crimes: 
The Limited Influence of Sentencing Discounts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 69, 93 (2006). 
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crime of genocide and complicity in genocide.254 Departing from its 
practice in the past, the Chief Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte 
subsequently made a deal with Plavšić to withdraw the counts and 
allegations specifically pertaining to genocide and complicity in 
genocide and also all remaining crimes, with the exception of 
persecution as a crime against humanity. In return, Plavšić would 
plead guilty to one count for the crime of persecution.255 
She was the first defendant for whom the Prosecution 
willingly withdrew the genocide charges from the indictment in 
exchange for a plea. Ironically, this first time willingness came in a 
case were the defendant was most likely among the more culpable for 
the allegedly genocidal policies from among those charged with the 
crime.256 Given the magnitude of the case, the high ranking and 
profile of the accused, the gravity of her crimes (as originally alleged), 
and the fact that the Chief Prosecutor herself appeared at an 
accused’s sentencing hearing, which she rarely did, the people of 
Yugoslavia and the international community rightfully expected an 
accounting for Del Ponte’s decision to drop genocide from the 
indictment. However, she offered no explanation in the public forum 
of an international courtroom. Nor did the judges press her for one. 
If there was a good reason for the compromise, it did not appear in 
the Court’s official records or sentencing judgment. 
                                                 
254 Prosecutor v. Plavšić, Case No. IT-00-40-I, Indictment, para. 19 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 3, 2000), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/plavsic/ind/en/pla-ii000407e.pdf. The counts were: 
Count 1(Genocide) and Count 2 (Complicity in Genocide). 
255 Prosecutor v. Plavšić, Case No. IT-00-39&40-PT, Plea Agreement 
(Int’l Crim Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 30, 2002), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/plavsic/custom4/en/020930plea_en.pdf. This was 
filed ex parte confidential and under seal. This document is available and on file with 
the author. 
256 In her published memoirs, Del Ponte describes Plavšić as a “close 
associate” of the notorious Radovan Karadzic and Momcilo Krajisnik. Del Ponte 
further claims that Plavšić “participated at the highest political levels in the 
campaign to dismember Bosnia and Herzegovina and ethnically cleanse large 
swaths of its territory.” See CARLA DEL PONTE, MADAME PROSECUTOR: 
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IMPUNITY 160 (2008). 
 2014 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 3:1 
96 
If the judges genuinely believe that the goal of reconciliation 
is central to the Tribunal’s mandate, that International Tribunals have 
the capacity to contribute to reconciliation, and that substantial 
sentencing reductions actually promote reconciliation, then they must 
account for why genocide was removed from the scope of Plavšić 
liability and why a prison sentence of eleven years supports rather 
than undermines the goal of reconciliation. The absence of 
transparency regarding the circumstances resulting in a factual record 
narrower than the original indictment undermines reconciliation and 
truth finding. Rather than address difficult questions about 
responsibility and punishment that are crucial to the goal of 
reconciliation, international sentencing judgments idealize 
reconciliation as vague aspirations of ICL while remaining 
impervious to factors that undermine it. The judgments mistake 
acceptance of responsibility and apology (often short lived) for 
reconciliation. Del Ponte has even admitted that Plavšić’s admissions 
and apologies offered nothing towards reconciliation.257 The Plavšić 
Trial Chamber’s discussion and analysis of reconciliation raises three 
concerns in relation to sentencing. 
  a. Is reconciliation itself mitigating? – Certain post-crime actions by 
the accused, such as expression of remorse, truth-telling, cooperation 
with the Prosecutor, and genuine and sincere acceptance of 
responsibility have been accepted as appropriate reasons to mitigate 
the punishment of a convicted person precisely because these factors, 
inter alia, potentially contribute to the aim of reconciliation. However, 
the Plavšić Trial Chamber appears to go beyond this and treat 
reconciliation itself as an independent mitigating factor. 
The problem with treating reconciliation as an independent 
ground for sentence mitigation lies in the limitations of criminal 
justice legalism. Reconciliation is better understood as a slow 
rebuilding process, not an event. While judicial institutions are quite 
capable of determining whether a war criminal “voluntarily 
surrendered,” they are not particularly apt at predicting future events. 
Whether the accused has “contributed to reconciliation” is usually 
difficult to measure with legal certainty. It cannot be put sufficiently 
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beyond the realms of speculation so as to satisfy the Tribunal’s legal 
standards or the requirements of law.258 Some factors relevant to 
assessing a defendant’s contribution to reconciliation are admittedly 
less speculative such as an accused who goes door to door 
apologizing to specific families that he has victimized, or volunteers 
for demining operations, or helps victims identify locations whether 
murdered family members have been hidden or buried. But the 
contribution to reconciliation of factors, such as a general apology, 
on which the Plavšić Trial Chamber relied, is highly speculative. 
Moreover, they can be undone in a way that concert action (such as 
the above list) beyond mere words cannot be. Thus, as is the case 
with other consequentialist aims, the court treads in dangerous 
territory when judges allow reconciliation to influence its sentencing 
allocations. 
For example, Plavšić gave an interview to Banja Luka ATV 
on March 11th, 2005, that undermines her purported contribution to 
reconciliation based on her apology and public statement that the 
judge used to justify mitigating her penalty to eleven years 
imprisonment.259 Barely two years after her public remorse and 
apology in the courtroom of the ICTY, she denied all responsibility 
for her role in the atrocities to the viewing public back in the former 
Yugoslavia. With thousands, if not tens of thousand, of persons 
whose lives she victimized, she emphatically claimed: (1) she only 
pled guilty because witnesses that would establish her innocence were 
afraid to come forward; (2) smug international judges sitting in The 
Hague far away from the realities of the conflict could not 
comprehend that a high ranking person in her position, removed 
from the battlefield, may not know what is going on at the ground 
level; (3) Western powers accept that the real culprits of the conflict 
                                                 
258 While aggravating circumstance must be proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt, mitigating circumstance need only be proved on a balance of probabilities. 
See Prosecutor v. Milan Simić, Case No. IT-95-9/2-S, Sentencing Judgment, paras. 
39-40 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 17, 2002), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/milan_simic/tjug/en/sim-sj021017e.pdf. 
259 Interview by Banja Luka ATV with Biljana Plavšić (Mar. 11, 2005), 
http://www.atvbl.com/home.php?id=billjanaintervju. An unofficial translation 
into English by the ICTY Outreach Office in Sarajevo is available on file with the 
author. 
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where the Bosnians that wanted independence in the first place.260 To 
the victims, her statements most likely came across as: (1) I am not 
responsible; (2) the Bosnian Serb leadership is not responsible; and 
(3) the victims got what they deserved. Perhaps Del Ponte and the 
international judges had no reason to suspect that Plavšić would so 
fantastically and publically unravel the foundations of her mitigated 
penalty. Nevertheless, the experience illustrated why the ICC should 
not entangle with consequentialist aspirations. At least, judges should 
not allow the goal of reconciliation to influence sentencing 
allocations. 
b.  Failure to link lack of cooperation to sentencing discounts based on 
purported contribution to reconciliation. – The sentencing law of 
international criminal courts and tribunals recognize cooperation with 
the Prosecutor or Court as a mitigation factor.261 Under the ICTY 
rules in particular, it is the only mitigation factor explicitly provided. 
Plavšić firmly refused to cooperate with the ICTY OTP, despite 
several interventions by Del Ponte and her team to get Plavšić to 
reverse course.262 When Del Ponte tried to include in the plea 
agreement a condition that Plavšić agree to be a witness in the cases 
of persons who bore the greatest responsibility for the atrocities such 
as Radovan Karadzić, Momčilo Krajišnik, and Ratko Mladić, Plavšić 
flatly refused and the Chief Prosecutor backed down.263 Del Ponte 
would later write in her memoirs that Plavšić had deceived her into 
thinking that she would cooperate.264 
If part of the justification for the Prosecution to engage in 
plea-bargaining lies in the theory of “breaking the circle of silence” 
among the leadership, then her guilty plea wholly deprived 
international justice of any such benefit. In fact, she appears to go out 
of her way to insulate them and protect them from the atrocities she 
                                                 
260 See id. 
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acknowledges took place. She expressly stated that the responsibility 
for the crimes to which she bore witness are hers and hers “alone” 
and do not “extend to other leaders who have the right to defend 
themselves”.265 Her failure to cooperate should have been factored in 
to the weight given to her “contribution to reconciliation.” I am not 
suggesting that the court do what the Blaskic Trial Chamber did when 
it treated non-cooperation as an aggravating factor.266 The 
international sentencing jurisprudence correctly rejects such an 
approach.267 Nevertheless, failure to cooperation with international 
justice is relevant to assessing the accused’s “contribution to 
reconciliation.” Plavšić’s conduct and statements carefully avoid 
implicating her co-perpetrators Karadžić and Krajišnik in the 
atrocities and cast doubt on her commitment to reconciliation. 
Loyalty to her fellow nationalist over accounting for crimes 
perpetrated against other ethnic groups does little to defuse ethnic 
tensions. The judges noted expert testimony that “full disclosure in 
confessions is vital for the reconciliatory process.”268 Again, we see 
another example of the international judges failing to meaningfully 
analyze the accused’s conduct and factors relevant to punishment in 
relation to what they earlier identified as the purpose of sentencing, 
in this case, reconciliation. Plavšić’s failure to disclose the role of 
other high-ranking Serbs in atrocity crimes to the full extent of her 
knowledge undermines the goal of reconciliation. The judges should 
have weighed the potential adverse impact this has on their 
purported goal, especially because they used reconciliation ideology 
to justify a lower sentence.269 
                                                 
265 Dragan Stanimirovic, Plavsic’s Guilt Trip, TRANSITIONS ONLINE (Dec. 
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Local reactions support my argument. Sefko Alomerović, 
President of the Helsinki Board in Sandzak at the time of Plavšić’s 
sentencing, also drew attention to her failure to “bring into question 
the state policy that led towards the extinction of the Bosnian people, 
in which she played an important role.”270 Although the Trial 
Chamber expressly disagreed with the Prosecutor’s evaluation of the 
weight to be accorded to this factor in mitigation,271 in light of the 
foregoing, the Prosecutor’s assessment seems to better capture the 
extent of her contribution to reconciliation. The OTP recommended 
a prison term of fifteen to twenty-fix years.272 The Trial Chamber 
sentenced her to eleven years.273 This was not the first time a trial 
chamber imposed a sentence lower than the Prosecutor’s 
recommendation, but it was the first time the Prosecutor did not 
appeal a low sentence outside its recommended range. 
c. Superior position results in paradoxical boost for mitigation. – 
Generally, sentencing discounts for guilty pleas are justified on the 
grounds of their functional utility, namely that plea bargains can 
result in efficiency benefits by saving costs and Tribunal resources 
related to investigation, counsel fees, trial costs, etc. The Plavšić Trial 
Chamber, however, attempts to offer more than a functional 
justification for plea bargains that result in large sentencing 
reductions by arguing that they substantially contribute to the 
Tribunal’s presumed mandate. In the Plavšić case, the judges 
characterized Plavšić’s negotiated and carefully contrived guilty plea 
as a genuine expression of remorse that contributed to reconciliation, 
rather than a self-interested maneuvered that resulting in limiting her 
criminal liability and punishment.274 
Apparently, the Trial Chamber was guided in this direction by 
the Prosecutor who amplified the mitigating value of Plavšić’s 
contribution to “reconciliation” and “expressions of remorse” based 
                                                 
270 See Milanka Saponja-Hadzic, Hague Deals Reduce Impact, INST. OF WAR 
& PEACE REPORTING (July 24, 2003), http://iwpr.net/report-news/hague-deals-
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271 Prosecutor v. Plavšić, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 36, at para. 
130. 
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on her superior position as a high-ranking and high-profiled member 
of the Bosnian Serb war leadership.275 
The Trial Chamber noted: “[t]he Prosecution states that this 
expression of remorse is noteworthy since it is offered from a person who 
formerly held a leadership position, and that it ‘merits judicial 
consideration.’”276 Thus, the Plavšić Trial Chamber endorsed the 
notion that expressions of remorse have added value for the 
purposes of reconciliation when offered by high-ranking defendants, 
and thus are deserving of greater reduction in sentence.277 This 
position, however, is at odds with basic principles of justice and the 
ICTY’s own jurisprudence, which has long held that the superior 
position of the accused is a factor that aggravates, rather than 
mitigates, the accused’s punishment. 
Unfortunately, the Plavšić precedent favoring high-ranking 
perpetrators when it comes to mitigation of penalty based on 
contribution to reconciliation is having a pernicious influence on the 
subsequent cases. In some cases, it appears that both the Prosecutor 
and the judges award less sentencing reduction for low-level 
defendants who contribute to reconciliation.278 Citing the Plavšić 
ruling, some defense counsels even appear convinced that their 
client’s potential contribution to reconciliation is only worth arguing 
if the client is a person of high rank.279 
3. The perverse effects of reconciliation 
As noted above, reconciliation was not a significant factor in 
sentencing in the early practice of the ICTY. However, since the 
Plavšić Sentencing Judgment, it has received frequent consideration by 
trial chambers when addressing sentencing. In the Plavšić case, it 
                                                 
275 Id. at para. 70. 
276 Prosecutor v. Plavšić, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 36, at para. 70 
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exerted a significant influence in mitigating her punishment. Many 
commentators consider Plavšić’s eleven-year sentence to be very 
lenient in both absolute terms and in symbolic terms.280 As it has 
done with other factors such as deterrence and rehabilitation, the 
Appeals Chamber should likewise encourage a cautious approach 
towards awarding significant reduction of the penalty on the basis of 
“contribution towards reconciliation.” Caution here is justified on 
both moral and practical basis. The Plavšić case illustrates why. 
During Plavšić’s sentencing hearing, I observed, first hand, 
defense counsel argue to the judges that her remorse and acceptance 
of responsibility was a more significant contribution to reconciliation 
than had the same come from a lower ranking perpetrator. Defense 
counsel boldly declared: “what greater contribution do you have to 
your mandate than my client’s—a person at the very top of the 
Bosnian Serb leadership—admission of responsibility.”281 Never 
mind that her limited acceptance of responsibility was known to the 
judges or that her remorse proved to be ostensible. Nonetheless, all 
this coming from the Defense was largely expected. The real surprise 
was that Chief Prosecutor Carla de Ponte, in a rare court appearance 
at a sentencing hearing, made the same argument but even more 
emphatically.282 She argued that as a high-ranking figure and former 
leader, her remorse and contribution to reconciliation is particular 
noteworthy and merits special consideration.283 Thus, in advancing a 
framework for how reconciliation should influence sentencing 
allocations, the Chief Prosecutor advocates for greater sentencing 
reductions for those in high-ranking positions, thereby turning upside 
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down the relationship between superior position and punishment.284 
The judges agreed, finding that Plavšić’s position at the very top of 
the Bosnian Serb Presidency gave “significant weight” to her 
contribution to reconciliation. Because the Trial Chamber accepted 
the goal of reconciliation as a relevant factor for fixing a sentence, it 
was able to justify substantial reduction of prison time. 
Accordingly, greater contributions to reconciliation merit 
greater reduction in punishment. Unfortunately, ICTY judges and the 
Chief Prosecutor appear to weigh the value of an accused’s 
contribution to reconciliation based largely on his or her rank. Under 
their approach, high-ranking offenders, who accept responsibility for 
their wrongdoings, deserve more sentencing reduction than low-level 
individuals merely because of their status. The perverse effect of this 
consequentialist approach towards punishment is that the leaders 
who are most culpable for the atrocities receive greater sentencing 
discounts, as demonstrated by how the ICTY subsequently dealt with 
the punishment of low-level perpetrators.285 Adding to a sense of 
injustice is the fact that their purported “contribution to 
reconciliation” is in relation to sufferings and atrocities that the 
leaders themselves created. 
Therefore, the logical conclusion of the reconciliation 
ideology adopted by the Plavšić Trial Chamber is that less culpable 
and lower ranking perpetrators will not receive the same degree of 
mitigation, resulting in higher penalties. If so, this would be elitism at 
its worst and consequentialism at its most perverse. In order to test 
this hypothesis, I examined the ICTY sentencing judgments to 
identify cases similar to Plavšić. Two cases—the prosecutions of 
Miroslav Bralo and Dragon Nikolić—shared several factors in 
common with the Plavšić case. Both involved plea-bargained guilty 
pleas, convictions for crimes against humanity, underlying crimes that 
included killings and murder, and in both cases, the trial judges found 
reconciliation to be a mitigation factor in sentencing. 
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In the Bralo case, a Croatian defendant—a relatively minor 
figure in the conflict—was initially only charged with war crimes.286 
Because of his complete self-effacing cooperation with the 
Prosecutor, Miroslav Bralo exposed himself to further criminal 
liability for persecution as a crime against humanity. The Prosecution 
mercilessly moved to amend the indictment to expanded Bralo’s 
individual criminal responsibility to include the crime of 
persecution.287 Bralo did not oppose the motion. In fact, he did not 
challenge or dispute any charge or allegation in the extended 
indictment and pled guilty to all charges.288 The trial judges 
considered his unexpurgated acceptance of criminal responsibility as 
an unequivocal sign of sincere remorse and willingness to be held 
accountable.289 
As noted above, the process leading to an accused’s 
admission to his or her participation in atrocity crimes and ethnic 
violence impacts the goal of reconciliation. Plavšić and Bralo stand in 
sharp contrast. The former machinated to limit and diffuse the scope 
and gravity of her crimes, successfully minimizing her criminal 
responsibility. Her plea deal included charge reduction with the 
removal of genocide from the record, thereby alternating the 
narrative of the conflict and degree of victimization. Bralo, on the 
other hand, showed unabridged acknowledgement of his moral 
blameworthiness and took full responsibility for his wrongful 
conduct. While Plavšić bargained down her responsibility, Bralo 
accepted responsibility beyond the initial charges against him. 
Working from the ICTY premise that reconciliation is an 
appropriate goal of sentencing for international crimes, Bralo’s 
contribution to reconciliation arguably merits greater mitigation.290 
The Trial Chamber found that Bralo apologized to victims in person 
and through personalized letters, identified previously unknown 
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locations of mass graves allowing survivors to carry out funerals for 
their departed in accordance with their religion and customs, in some 
cases exhuming the body from the mass grave himself, and 
participated in de-mining operations.291 This may be understood as 
direct reconciliatory acts. It is more tangible to individual victims than 
Plavšić’s prescribed general apology. Although the Tribunal held that 
Bralo contributed to reconciliation,292 it did not afford Bralo’s acts as 
much weight in mitigation as was awarded to Plavšić. Has the ICTY’s 
reconciliation ideology turned the significance of superior position or 
authority as an aggravating factor upside down? Plavšić’s punishment 
was imprisonment for eleven years. Bralo received a prison sentence 
of twenty years,293 nearly twice as much as Plavšić, despite the fact 
that she was in the very highest echelons of the Bosnian Serb 
leadership prosecuting the war, second only to Radovan Karadzić.294 
At the time of her sentencing, she was the highest-ranking figure on 
any side of the conflict to be punished by the ICTY.295 Bralo was a 
relatively low ranking figure, a Croatian foot soldier in a notorious 
military unit with little or no command authority.296 Dragon Nikolić, 
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also a relatively low level perpetrator, was sentenced to 23 twenty-
three years of imprisonment.297 
Plavšić’s low sentence compared to higher penalties for Bralo 
and Nikolić is inconsistent with the Tribunal’s sentencing practice 
and legal rulings that superior position or authority is an aggravating 
factor. By this measure, Plavšić should have received a more severe 
punishment, all other material factors being equal—and they 
generally are. Similarly, the difference in the distribution of 
punishment does not square with Tribunal sentencing law in that 
cooperation with the Prosecution is a significant mitigating factor, if 
not the most significant. The trial judges found that Bralo and 
Nikolić substantially cooperated with the Prosecutor, a mitigating 
factor that was absent in Plavšić’s case. Compounding the disparity, 
one could reasonably conclude that cooperation with the Court or 
the Prosecutor itself constitutes “contribution towards 
reconciliation.” Likewise, it would have been reasonable for the trial 
chambers to treat intentional non-cooperation as diminishing the 
value of an accused’s asserted contribution to reconciliation. In sum, 
analyzing the court’s treatment of the two sentencing factors—one 
aggravating factor (superior position/authority) and one mitigating 
circumstance (cooperation with the Prosecution)—reveals perverse 
results where judges attempt to reflect the goal of reconciliation in 
sentencing allocations. Plavšić, who used her superior position to 
perpetrate grave crimes and offered no cooperation with the OTP, 
received a very lenient penalty, while other defendants, who were 
low-level perpetrators and cooperated with the Prosecution, received 
significantly harsher sentences. Reconciliation ideology was so 
influential that it resulted in misapplication of two well entrench 
sentencing principles in international criminal law. 
Judging by the fact that low-level offenders were punished 
twice has harshly as high-ranking perpetrators, the ICTY 
disproportionately awards more penalty reduction for reconciliation 
to the latter. Interestingly, the Bralo Trial Chamber stated that if there 
were no mitigating factors, it would have imposed a prison sentence 
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of twenty-five years.298 Thus, Bralo received a sentencing reduction of 
5 five years that accounts for all the mitigation factors found in his 
case. His contribution to reconciliation amounts to something much 
less than a 5 five-year discount, significantly lower than the discount 
given to Plavšić’s. 
Unfortunately, the perverse effects of consequentialism 
permeate the entire ICTY institution beyond the international judges. 
Consequentialism in the decision-making of the ICTY Prosecutor 
influenced its presentation of the case during oral arguments, its 
application of sentencing factors, and finally its sentencing 
recommendation. It argued that Plavšić’s contribution to 
reconciliation based on her “expression of remorse is noteworthy 
since it is offered from a person who formerly held a leadership 
position, and that it ‘merits judicial consideration.’”299 Thus, the 
Prosecutor links the mitigating value of an accused’s contribution to 
reconciliation to her superior position. Similarly, in cases where 
reconciliation is a factor, the OTP exercises its discretion to 
recommend sentences that offer greater penalty reduction to high-
ranking perpetrators. The court typically follows the OTP’s 
recommendations in plea bargains. 
For example, the Chief Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte 
recommended a prison sentence of fifteen to twenty-five years for 
Plavšić. She represented to the Court that if Plavšić had not pled 
guilty she would have recommended life imprisonment.300 Typically, 
the ICTY grants early release after the defendant has served two-
thirds of the sentence.301 Accordingly, when the OTP recommends a 
prison term of twenty-five years, it is effectively asking for a sentence 
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of a little more than sixteen-and-a-half years. Thus, its low-end 
recommendation of fifteen years in the Plavšić case is effectively a 
recommendation for ten years. The Trial Chamber gave Plavšić 
eleven years, which meant she was out in seven years and a few 
months. 
The OTP’s discretion was exercised more harshly when 
recommending a sentencing for Bralo. Although it initially asked for 
a prison sentence of twenty-five years, at the sentencing hearing the 
OTP stated that it was in fact seeking a “mandatory minimum” of 
twenty-five years.302 Thus, accounting for the two-thirds approach 
outline above, the OTP recommendation was effectively a prison 
sentence of thirty-seven-and-a-half years. The OTP’s policy towards 
reconciliation and mitigating factors indicate that it assigned less 
value to Bralo’s contribution to reconciliation because he is a low 
profile perpetrator, in other words, because of his status.303 Its policy 
manifested an aggressive recommendation for a harsher penalty for 
the low level perpetrator because he is a low level person, despite his 
cooperation with the Prosecution. The ICTY’s reconciliation 
ideology is driving this recommendation. 
A final point of interest here concerns Plavšić’s release from 
prison. She reserved her prison time at a women’s prison called 
“Hinseberg” located in Frövi, Örebro County, Sweden. The inmates 
call it “the castle” because it is a mansion overlooking a lake.304 The 
prisoners can engage in artistic activities, enjoy saunas, bake for 
leisure, and even ride horses.305 In 2009, after serving two-thirds of 
her sentence, she applied to the ICTY for early release.306 Although 
her application for early release was made after her repudiation of 
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responsibility on public television, something she repeated again for a 
local newspaper,307 ICTY President Judge Patrick Robinson granted 
her motion for release finding that she was “rehabilitated.”308 No 
mention was made of her renunciation of responsibility, her slide 
backwards towards justifying her criminal behavior, or her complete 
nullification of her apology, which was central to mitigating her 
sentence.309 
CONCLUSION 
With the creation of the ICC, international criminal justice 
gained a permanent mechanism with potentially global reach. The 
potential latent in such an international court has fueled high 
expectations.310 Yet, the growing list of objectives and goals has 
resulted in unrealistic expectations of international prosecutions of 
atrocity crimes. Consequently, fulfilment of the core functions of 
international criminal justice has been jeopardized. The pressure to 
chase aggrandized ambitions comes not only from politicians, or 
special interest groups, or media frenzies. Actors within the system, 
particularly international judges, have to some extent bought into 
romanticized notions that their legal institutions can achieve an 
awesome array of societal goals, even when some of those objectives 
are in direct conflict with each other. This overreach has had a 
negative impact on the sentencing of perpetrators of genocide, crimes 
against humanity, and war crimes. Judges at international criminal 
courts have elaborated a smorgasbord of ideological objectives for 
international criminal prosecutions, resulting in perverse and 
confusing justifications for individual sentences. 
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The ad hoc tribunals have drawn on a wide range of sources 
when identifying the sentencing rationales for international criminal 
justice. Although deterrence and retribution appear most frequently 
in the tribunal’s sentencing judgments, international judges appealed 
to a much wider range of justifications, legal and political, to 
legitimize their sentences, in particular sentences that would 
otherwise appear to be extremely lenient. This toggling at will 
between punitive and restorative approaches to punishment has 
opened the work of international criminal tribunals to criticism of 
bias, politicization, and victor’s justice. International idealism defeats 
itself. There are many learning lessons here for the ICC and pitfalls to 
avoid. 
This article’s findings caution against international criminal 
justice mechanism becoming too entangled with idealistic aspirations, 
such as reconciliation or producing a historical record, at the cost of 
their primary function to punish perpetrators of atrocity crimes. By 
analyzing the tribunals’ jurisprudence, this article demonstrates how 
international judges often veer off course away from their primary 
role in light of the realistic capacity of international criminal courts 
when attempting to achieve other well-meaning goals that are beyond 
the institutional capacity of international criminal courts. This results 
in problematic rulings, distortion of responsibility or accountability, 
and ultimately failure to achieve the desired aspirations because of 
institutional and structural limitations. 
Arguably, international judges cannot commit to serious 
punitive measures and simultaneously prioritize pragmatic 
considerations, as weak institutions must—such as, incentivizing 
voluntary surrender or encouraging cooperation. Perhaps they are 
unwilling to impose meaningful penalties out of misplaced idealism 
that their leniency will bring other high-ranking perpetrators, those 
who bear the greatest responsibility, to the table. This strategy failed. 
None of the remaining most wanted perpetrators followed Plavšić’s 
suit in either surrendering to the court or admitting responsibility. 
Krajišnik maintained his innocence and opted for a trial.311Karadzić 
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and Mladić refused to surrender.312 Vojislav Šešelj defiantly denounce 
the ICTY as an “illegal tribunal” and his court appointed counsel as a 
“spy” for Western imperialism.313 
An analysis of the sentencing jurisprudence suggests that 
international judges pick and choose, without principled justification, 
an ideology to follow in a particular case that serves the desired result 
they have in mind for that case. In subsequent cases, that ideology 
may be abandoned or marginalized, without explanation, if it proves 
to be an obstacle to their desired sentence. This is particularly true in 
the case of the ICTY where the sentencing jurisprudence lacks 
commitment to prioritizing a principle to guide sentencing 
allocations. In order words, ICL sentencing lacks commitment to a 
general principle that will influence its determination of a sentence. 
Another observation that may be made, aside from failure to 
identify a primary sentencing philosophy, is that quite often the 
proffered rationales are inconsistent with the actual sentencing 
results. Under-theorization and the absence of scholarly examination 
of the sentencing jurisprudence of international criminal courts has 
left us with an ad hoc approach to sentencing for genocide, crimes 
against humanity, and war crimes. In the absence of a guiding theory, 
the wide discretion given to international judges in sentencing has 
failed to produce a rational and consistent international sentencing 
practice. To the contrary, certain ideologies resulted in injustice in 
sentencing. This is particularly so when reconciliation ideology 
influenced the sentence, and therefore it should be abandoned or 
given very limited weight. A possible unfortunate legacy of the 
ICTY’s sentencing jurisprudence is that high-ranking perpetrators in 
leadership positions receive more reduction in prison sentence than 
foot soldiers where both are found to have “contributed toward 
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reconciliation.”314 Those most responsible for atrocities, in particular, 
have benefited the most when reconciliation was advanced as a 
rationale for mitigating punishment. They have received significantly 
reduced sentences, often lower than their subordinates, thus 
trivializing their culpability for the atrocities. Moreover, in general, 
most utilitarian aspirations associated with international criminal 
prosecutions should be abandoned as sentencing rationales because 
they distort the individual perpetrator’s culpability. 
This paper’s analysis demonstrates that when international 
judges give undue weight to utilitarian aspirations in their sentencing 
judgments, they distort and diminish the culpability and just 
distribution of punishment among the various actors’ responsibility 
for atrocity crimes in a situation. Moreover, the goals they seek to 
achieve with their sentencing reductions, like reconciliation, are 
beyond the immediate capacity of criminal courts. International 
prosecutions should assume a more modest posture regarding its 
capabilities, lest it damages its core responsibility of punishing 
perpetrators of atrocities crimes. This is not to say that international 
criminal justice cannot contribute to these aspirations, but rather that 
it should not be given weight as a factor in sentencing. 
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